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(EN)RAGED OR (EN)GAGED: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
RACIAL CONTEXT TO THE CANADIAN PROVOCATION
DEFENCE
Camille A Nelson*
I. INTRODUCTION'
Ice hockey is Canada's national pastime, much like baseball is
for many Americans. This fact makes the case of Regina v.
Smithers2 all the more interesting.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. B.A., University
of Toronto, Canada; LL.B., University of Ottawa, Canada; LL.M., Columbia Law School;
J.S.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School. Columbia University School of Law Faculty, and
Professors Patricia Williams and Peter Strauss in particular, provided much guidance and
support during the earlier drafts of this article. I also wish to thank Dean Jeffrey Lewis
and the faculty of Saint Louis University School of Law for their support. As my thoughts
developed, I was particularly grateful to the Law and Society Summer Institute 2000 par-
ticipants for providing valuable feedback. Special thanks to Professor Jon Goldberg-Miller
for his thorough reading of an earlier draft and his keen "post-colonial" suggestions. I ad-
ditionally wish to express my gratitude to the 2001 Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal
Scholarship Conference, held at the Dickinson School of Law, and the 2001 Northeastern
People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, held at the CUNY School of Law, for allow-
ing me the honor to present this paper as a work in progress. Thank you to Professor Kim
Forde-Mazrui for stimulating conversation regarding my thesis and for his careful reading
of an earlier draft. I appreciate the thorough reading and insightful suggestions made by
Professor George Edwards. Thank you to my Canadian colleagues from the Elizabeth Fry
Society working groups and the participants of the Canadian Department of Justice
round-table discussions for insightful commentary and challenging debate on many of the
aspects relevant to these difficult issues. Professor Elizabeth Sheehy's Women and the
Law Class was the genesis for my thinking on these issues-I wish to thank her for her
encouragement and instruction to publish in this area. I am grateful to Dean Peter Hogg
for his comments and reinforcement of my recollections on Charter of Rights and Freedom
jurisprudence. Finally, a special thanks to Ms. Leslie Patrice Butler, a wonderful and
hardworking research assistant.
1. Throughout this article I will not place a [sic] next to the Canadian spellings of
words. This choice reflects the fact that these are not incorrect, but rather are different,
equally valid spellings. Indeed, the very spelling of the word "defence" differs from country
to country. I have decided, since I am focusing on the Canadian defence of provocation, it
would be appropriate to adopt the Canadian spelling.
2. [19781 1 S.C.R. 506 (Can.).
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On February 18, 1973, a league hockey game was played be-
tween two teams comprised of teenaged young men.3 The leading
player on one team-the deceased Barrie Cobby-was sixteen or
seventeen years of age at the time.4 Paul Smithers, the appellant,
was the leading player on the opposing team and was sixteen
years of age.5
The game was rough, the players were aggressive, and feelings
ran high.6 The courts indicate that Smithers was black,7 yet they
do not indicate the race of the other players. As such, it may be
reasonable to assume that all of the other players were white.
This is relevant insofar as the record indicates that Smithers was
"subjected to racial insults by [Cobby] and other members of the
opposing team."' Cobby and Smithers jostled with each other on
several occasions during the game.9 The animosity between the
two hockey players was exacerbated by the alleged racial over-
tones in Cobby's conduct.1 °
Following heated and abusive exchanges of profanities, both
Smithers and Cobby were ejected from the hockey game." Smith-
ers was upset by the insulting language directed at him and made
threats that he would "get" Cobby. 2 Upon leaving the arena after
the game, approximately forty-five minutes later, Smithers at-
tempted to start a fight with Cobby.'3 While restrained by mem-
bers of Cobby's team, Smithers managed to deliver a kick to
Cobby's stomach. 4 Following the kick, Cobby fell to the ground on
his back and gasped for air. 5 Within five minutes he had stopped
3. Id. at 506.
4. Id. The appellate court and the Supreme Court offered different ages of the de-
ceased.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. I use the term "black" intentionally, as I find it to be, generally, a more inclusive
term than African-American. Besides, I am not African-American, nor am I African-
Canadian. If I have to be defined according to this dichotomy, I suppose the most accurate
label is Jamaican-Canadian.
8. Smithers, [1978] 1 S.C.R. at 506.
9. Id.
10. R. v. Smithers, [1975] 9 O.R.2d 127, 131 (Ont. C.A.) (Houlden, J., dissenting). The
majority adopted the statement of facts in Justice Houlden's dissent. Id. at 128.
11. Smithers, [1978] 1 S.C.R. at 506.
12. Id. at 508.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 508-09.
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breathing and was later pronounced dead upon arrival at the
hospital. 6
This tragic case is curious on a number of levels. While clearly
articulated and narrowly focused on causation issues, the Court's
reasoning as a whole seemed to lack any critical recognition of the
disturbing racial context within which the altercation arose. The
case involved manslaughter, with provocation being the principal
issue.'7 The indictment charged that Smithers killed Cobby by
kicking him and thereby committed manslaughter," however, no
judicial reasoning averted to the racially abusive context and the
relevance, if any, that such a context could have in Smithers's de-
fence. This was all the more disconcerting given that this case
traveled all the way to the highest court in the land, the Supreme
Court of Canada.
The case of R. v. Olbey'9 presents another example of an oppor-
tunity for judicial consideration of the relevance of racial context.
In Olbey, there was evidence that the deceased's reference to the
accused, Olbey, as a "two-bit nigger punk" triggered the homicidal
reaction of Olbey, who was black.2" Although the ensuing argu-
ment resulted in the death of the person who uttered the racial
epithet, the courts were adamant that it is "difficult to reach a
conclusion that there was any evidence of a wrongful act or insult
of such nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of
the power of self-control."2' In this case, the construction of the
ordinary person had not yet progressed to the point where the or-
dinary person could be conceived of as racialized."2
16. Id. at 509.
17. Id. at 508.
18. Id.
19. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1008 (Can.). Leonard Olbey was found guilty of murdering Paul
Patterson. Id. at 1010. The deceased died from bullet wounds due to Olbey shooting him
three times. Id. at 1017. The murder took place in the home of a known drug dealer after
Olbey and Patterson had been chastising each other over who was the better "dope
dealer." Id. at 1018.
20. Id. at 1017.
21. Id. at 1022.
22. The term "racialized" recognizes that "race" is not of scientific origin. Rather, race
is a manufactured social and cultural construct with structural and personal ramifications
and implications. The socio-cultural construction of race highlights that there is no bio-
logical reality to these descriptions. Ironically, the necessarily practical adoption of "race-
speech" and "racial-identification" creates a tension between denying the validity of race,
while at the same time seeking "universal," or at least "translatable" conceptions to convey
the information. The term "racialized" is used to refer to persons from communities that
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While Olbey might be decided differently today, given the di-
rectness and specificity of the insults involved, racial contextuali-
zation23 of the situation confronting the defendants appears to be
a topic that the courts were, then, unprepared to address. Since
the rendering of these decisions, however, the Canadian judiciary
has demonstrated less resistance to such contextual investigation
and, in some cases, has even embraced the need for greater ap-
preciation of the realities of marginalized communities.24
This article explores the Canadian provocation defence as pro-
vided in section 232 of the Criminal Code2' and argues that there
have been traditionally marginalized due to "racial characteristics." Such communities are
also commonly referred to as "people of color," "visible minorities," or "racial minorities."
For further information on the construction of race, see generally TOMMY L. LOTT, THE
INVENTION OF RACE: BLACK CULTURE AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION (1999).
23. I use this term in an effort to capture the relevance of race and/or racism in a
given situation. Racism has been defined as a symbolic system organizing a range of social
inequalities and negative associations and judgements construed around the concept of
race. See David Mason, On the Dangers of Disconnecting Race and Racism, 28 SOCIOLOGY
845, 855 (1994). Race is a concept generated across a range of discourses and used to dis-
tinguish and classify human beings. CAROLINE KNOWLES, RACE DISCOURSE AND
LABOURISM (1992). The concept of race generally has some phenotypical component such
as skin color upon which social, cultural, and psychological differences are constructed.
Some scholars describe race as referring to a classification of human bodies which is an
instantly recognizable part of who we are. See generally Howard Winant, Racial Forma-
tion and Hegemony: Global and Local Developments, in RACISM, MODERNITY AND IDENTITY
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 266-89 (Ali Rattansi & Sallie Westwood eds., 1994). The signifi-
cance of race is "invented," as it has no general meaning but only acquires significance
through social practices, cultural scripts, and political contexts. See Caroline Knowles, Ra-
cism and Psychiatry, 33 TRANSCULTURAL PSYCHIATRY RES. REV. 297 (1996). This invented
meaning may be relevant to any formulation of the provocation defence insofar as the de-
fence seeks to address human frailties resulting in violence. Thus, reaction to social ineq-
uities and negative associations attributed to race may properly infuse the provocation
defence where an accused reacted violently to racism.
24. See R. v. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 (Can.); R. v. Bartle, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173
(Can.); Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 (Can.); R. v. Lavallee, [1990 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.);
Comm. for Justice and Liberty v. Nat'l Energy Bd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 (Can.); R. v. Parks,
[1993] 15 O.R.3d 324 (Ont. C.A.); see also Claire L'Heureux-Dube, Economic Consequences
of Divorce: A View from Canada, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 451, 462 (1994). Ms. L'Heureux-Dube, a
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, discusses judicial notice as a concept which man-
dates that the judiciary be informed of relevant social context.
25. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 232 (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Criminal Code].
Section 232 of the Canadian Criminal Code reads:
(1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to
manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of passion
caused by sudden provocation.
(2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to
deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provocation for the
purposes of this section if the accused acted on it on the sudden and before
there was time for his passion to cool.
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is precedent and theory supportive of racial contextualization of
the defence. Part II explains the theory behind the provocation
defence and the potential for racial contextualization, and it rec-
ognizes some of the challenges presented by any expansion of the
defence. This section also introduces the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (the "Charter")26 as a possible mechanism
that might be utilized to prevent oppressive use of the defence.
Part III explains each element of the provocation defence and,
where relevant, highlights the manner in which the objective test
may be expanded to account for racial contextualization. Part IV
recognizes some of the criticisms of the provocation defence, in-
cluding provocation as femicide, validating homophobia, cultural
essentialism, and as an illegitimate excuse. Before concluding,
Part V considers theoretical support for a reformulation of the de-
fence and recognizes that the defence must guard against recog-
nizing extreme expressions of rage.
II. THE PROVOCATION DEFENCE
Canadian law uses both objective and subjective criteria in the
application of the provocation defence. This defence is available
only for a charge of murder; where provocation is found to exist, it
reduces murder to manslaughter." When sentencing for other of-
fences, the courts consider provocation as a mitigating factor.
Therefore, the defence of provocation applies to murder only to al-
low mitigation of what otherwise is an automatic penalty of life
(3) For the purposes of this section, the questions
(a) whether a particular wrongful act or insult amounted to provoca-
tion, and
(b) whether the accused was deprived of the power of self-control by
the provocation that he alleges he received,
are questions of fact, but no one shall be deemed to have given provocation to
another by doing anything that he had a legal right to do, or by doing any-
thing that the accused incited him to do in order to provide the accused with
an excuse for causing death or bodily harm to any human being.
Id.
26. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
[hereinafter Charter].
27. See R. v. Campbell, [1977] 38 C.C.C.2d 6 (Ont. C.A.), which held that provocation
is not a defence to attempted murder. See id. at 15. The provocation defence is available
only where the elements of murder otherwise exist. Id. However, provocation could be
relevant in deciding whether the accused had the necessary mens rea. Id. at 15-16. See
also Todd Archibald, The Interrelationship Between Provocation and Mens Rea: A Defence
of Loss of Self-control, 28 C.L.Q. 454 (1985-1986).
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imprisonment. 2' Hence, the problematic ramifications of the Ca-
nadian scheme of mandatory minimum sentences remains a con-
cern. The lack of judicial discretion in sentencing persons con-
victed of murder has led me on a quest to determine where "racial
context,"29 in the form of mitigation, could be infused into de-
fences when such context has contributed to fatal violence. Provo-
cation is already an anomaly, as it is the only statutory partial
defence available in Canadian criminal law." As such, it may
provide a suitable framework for consideration of racial contextu-
alization as a possible mitigating factor.
If the accused has killed under the circumstances set out in
section 232 of the Criminal Code-the provocation provision-he
or she may be convicted of the lesser offence of manslaughter." In
order to be provoked, one must be the victim of a wrongful act or
insult that is "sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the
power of self-control." 2 This part of the test is considered "objec-
tive" as the judge or jury must consider whether an "ordinary
person" would have lost self-control in the same circumstances in
which the accused responded violently.3 If the objective part of
the test is satisfied, the judge or jury next considers the subjec-
tive question of whether the accused was, in fact, deprived of self-
control.3 4 Finally, the accused must have acted "on the sudden,"
before there was time for "his passion to cool."35
The following quote from the Ontario Court of Appeal is helpful
in understanding the rationale for the provocation defence.
The defence of provocation exists with respect to a charge of murder
even though all the elements of the definition of murder have been
established; it is an allowance made for human frailty which recog-
28. See ALAN W. MEWETT & MORRIS MANNING, MEWETT & MANNING ON CRIMINAL
LAW 729 (1994); Rajvinder Sahni, Crossing the Line: R. v. Thibert and the Defence of
Provocation, 55 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 143 (1997).
29. For a comprehensive examination of the role of racism in the Canadian criminal
justice system, see Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism, in THE ONTARIO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Eric Mills ed., Dec. 1995).
30. See Tim Quigley, Deciphering the Defence of Provocation, 38 U.N.B.L.J. 11 (1989).
There are, however, common law defences, such as intoxication, that effectively operate as
partial defences.
31. Criminal Code § 232(1).
32. Id. § 232(2).
33. R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313, 314 (Can.).
34. Id.
35. Criminal Code § 232(2).
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nizes that a killing, even an intentional one, is extenuated by the loss
of self-control caused by adequate provocation, and is less heinous
than an intentional killing by a person in possession of his self-
control. It is unnecessary to invoke the defence of provocation until
all the elements of murder have been proved.36
This justification of the defence is still valid today. 7 Hence, the
fundamental question is whether an uncontrolled fatally violent
impulse can be attributed to human frailty, justifying some com-
passion. 8 Indeed, in the leading Canadian case, R. v. Hill,9 Chief
Justice Dickson stated that the defence "acknowledge [s] that all
human beings are subject to uncontrollable outbursts of passion
and anger which may lead them to do violent acts."0 Therefore, in
cases of provocation, "the law would lessen the severity of crimi-
nal liability."4 Thus, the defence of provocation does not negate
the intent to kill; rather, it acts as a justification or excuse that
mitigates that intention, as a concession to human weakness.
On its face the defence appears neutral and impartial. Histori-
cally, however, it has fallen prey to dubious, if not inappropriate,
application, which has been utilized to excuse both femicide and
homophobic rage.' Accordingly, the provocation defence has been
the subject of much justifiable criticism.' In Canada, the criti-
cism has culminated in calls for the complete abolition of the
provocation defence.45 For this reason, the Canadian Department
of Justice continues to evaluate the utility and appropriateness of
the defence.
The application of the defence of provocation has not been
without problems. Yet the defence may provide the sole vehicle
available to the defence which could allow for a contextual as-
36. R. v. Campbell, [1977] 38 C.C.C.2d 6, 15 (emphasis added).
37. See ISABEL GRANT ET AL., THE LAW OF HOMICIDE § 6.2 (1994).
38. Id. § 6.2, at 6-3.
39. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
40. Id. at 323.
41. Id.
42. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 199-200 (1987) (discuss-
ing provocation as either a partial justification or partial excuse and concluding that the
better classification is as a partial excuse).
43. See GRANT, supra note 37, at § 6.2(a); Joanne St. Lewis & Sheila Galloway, Re-
forming the Defence of Provocation, in ONTARIO WOMEN'S DIRECTORATE (1994); Andrde
CWt , The Defence of Provocation and Domestic Femicide (1994) (unpublished LL.M. the-
sis, University of Montreal) (on file with author) (Elenor Paul trans.).
44. See sources cited supra note 43.
45. See C6t6, supra note 43, at 29.
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sessment of systemic racism when it plays a role in triggering vio-
lent responses. The prerequisites for other common law defences,
such as self-defence and duress, render them unsuitable for in-
jecting relevant racial context as a mitigating factor.46 The de-
fence of insanity would only come into play if the "maddening" ef-
fects of racism actually were proven to have altered the psyche to
such an extent that the defendant lacked the cognitive or voli-
tional capacity required for criminal responsibility." Accordingly,
only the provocation defence may be useful as a defence where
the accused responded to racist abuse with violence, as in Olbey v.
The Queen" or R. v. Smithers.49 Furthermore, as the defence is
not exculpatory, but instead ultimately provides for a lesser sen-
tence, it may present a more acceptable counterpart to the
American system of mitigating sentences mandated by the Model
Penal Code." Canadian jurisprudence has progressed to the point
46. Section 34(1) of the Criminal Code, entitled Defence of Person, provides that a per-
son is justified in using force to repel an unprovoked unlawful attack. However, the justifi-
cation may be invoked by such person only where the force used: (a) was "not intended to
cause death or grievous bodily harm" to the assailant; and (b) was "no more than [was]
necessary" to defend oneself. Criminal Code § 34(1) (emphasis added). Section 34(2) applies
in cases where repelling the assailant results in death or in grievous bodily harm. Id. §
34(2). In these circumstances, the accused is justified in using force where: (a) she was un-
der a reasonable apprehension that her death or grievous bodily harm would result from
the initial or continuing violence of the assault; and (b) she believed on reasonable grounds
that she could not preserve herself from death or grievous bodily harm, other than by
causing death or grievous bodily harm to her assailant. Id.
Section 17 of the Criminal Code, entitled Compulsion by Threats, provides that for du-
ress to act as an excuse: (a) the threat must be of immediate death or bodily harm; (b) the
person making the threat must be present when the offence is committed; (c) the threat-
ened accused must believe that the threats will be carried out; and (d) the threatened ac-
cused must not be a party to a conspiracy or association whereby he is subject to compul-
sion. Id. § 17.
47. See id. § 16, amended by ch. 43, 1991 S.C. § 2. The language of the statute, enti-
tled Defence of Mental Disorder, is as follows:
(1) No person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission
made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person inca-
pable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of know-
ing that it was wrong.
(2) Every person is presumed not to suffer from a mental disorder so as to be
exempt from criminal responsibility by virtue of subsection (1), until the con-
trary is proved on the balance of probabilities.
(3) The burden of proof that an accused was suffering from a mental disorder
so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility is on the party that raises the
issue.
Id.
48. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1008 (Can.).
49. [1978] 1 S.C.R. 506 (Can.).
50. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
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where there is support for this contextual interpretation of the
defence.
Thus, calls for the wholesale abandonment of the provocation
defence may produce the result of foreclosing from trial consid-
eration a contextual assessment of the possible role of racism as a
cause and mitigator of a murder. A more scholarly version of "not
throwing the baby out with the bath water" may be gleaned from
the spirit of Professor Gayatri Spivak's notion of strategic essen-
tialism." While strategic essentialism entails the conscious deci-
sion, hopefully by community members, to essentialize the par-
ticular community for the purpose of a specific political goal,
perhaps an analogous strategy would be the strategic utilization
of a legal defence, despite reservations about its origins and his-
toric utilization. That the provocation defence might operate both
as sword and shield for marginalized communities could be rec-
ognized by a "strategic deployment" of the defence in racially
volatile situations where racial context might otherwise be ig-
nored.
The challenge is whether the conceptual complicity of the
provocation defence should automatically invalidate any capacity
for the defence to incorporate racial context. Despite the problem-
atic origins of the defence and its questionable use by some mem-
bers of the judiciary, the defence has a liberatory capacity that
may further an emancipatory project. Thus, strategic deployment
is helpful in recognizing that it is acceptable to use the defence
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 418 (6th ed. 1995). At least fourteen states have
adopted, in whole or in part, the Model Penal Code's "extreme emotional disturbance" for-
mula for reducing murder to manslaughter. Id. at 423. Arguably, the standard for such
disturbance is more lenient as the defence does not require a provoking or triggering
event. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has noted:
A homicide influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance, in contrast [to a
"hot blooded killing"], is not one which is necessarily committed in the "hot
blood" stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant mental
trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a long period of time and then
react violently, seemingly without provocation.
State v. Elliott, 411 A.2d 3, 7 (Conn. 1979).
51. See GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAg, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiog-
raphy, in IN OTHER WORLDS 197, 205 (1987), where Professor Spivak states:
I would read it [the Subaltern Studies Group text], then, as a strategic use of
positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest.... This
would allow them to use the critical force of anti-humanism... even as they
share its constitutive paradox that the essentializing moment, the object of
their criticism, is irreducible.
2002] 1015
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for this liberatory project, though recognizing all the while that it
was complicit with forces of domination.52 I would, therefore, ad-
vocate for the retention of the defence and a nuanced, contextual
approach to its application. Given the sexist and homophobic out-
comes for which the defence has been criticized, how might we
compensate for this tendency to use the defence in an oppressive
manner?
First, equality-seeking 3 parameters should be conceptualized
in order to curtail inappropriate use of the defence.54 The provoca-
tion defence ought not be permitted to excuse or justify homicides
motivated by bigotry against groups protected by the Charter.
The provocation defence would not be applicable if its success
would require a usurpation of the spirit or intent of the equality
rights provisions contained in the Charter.55 The Charter, which
is part of the Canadian Constitution, has several specific provi-
sions that may be helpful in addressing the issue of contextuali-
zation.56
52. See COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY: A READER (Patrick Wil-
liams & Laura Chrisman eds., 1994). See generally GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, THE
POST-COLONIAL CRITIC: INTERVIEWS, STRATEGIES, DIALOGUES (Sarah Harasym ed., 1990)
(discussing strategic essentialism); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
53. I give credit for the term "equality-seeking" to Joanne St. Lewis and Sheila Gallo-
way. See St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 21. To me, this term presupposes ine-
quality as the unfortunate norm. This inequality is based not only upon the enumerated
grounds recognized in the Charter but upon numerous bases, some of which have been
recognized as analogous grounds, i.e., sexual orientation.
54. By this I mean some mechanism to prevent reliance on the defence where the out-
come of such reliance would be a result which flies in the face of recognized equality prin-
ciples.
55. This approach is consistent with the views articulated in Hill v. Church of Scien-
tology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.), Dagenais v. CBC, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (Can.), and
RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Can.), whereby the Supreme Court of
Canada articulated that the spirit and intent of the Charter was persuasive even if the
Charter did not apply directly, and that the law should be interpreted and adopted in a
manner consistent with "Charter values."
56. Specifically, the Charter contains three relevant provisions. Section 15, en-
titled "Equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law" states
as follows:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or
PROVOCATION DEFENCE
The Charter offers explicit protection against discrimination
based upon race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age, or mental or physical disability, and it has been interpreted
to extend as well to certain analogous grounds, such as sexual ori-
entation. 7
Advocating this position would be difficult if the defence was
not statutory and subject to the actions of the Crown prosecutor,
an agent of the state. Since the Charter is applicable only to gov-
ernment actions, the role of the Crown prosecutor and the in-
volvement of federal legislation provide the necessary basis for
invoking the Charter."8
Not only is the role of the Crown as government actor persua-
sive, but the Charter has also been deemed to have an indirect ef-
fect upon the common law. 9 Specifically, Justice McIntyre, writ-
ing for the court in Dolphin Delivery, asserted that "the judiciary
ought to apply and develop the principles of the common law in a
manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the
Constitution."0 Since Dolphin Delivery concerned private liti-
gants, the principle should be all the more applicable in a crimi-
nal trial where the state is the moving party. Therefore, I do not
think it is inappropriate to assert that the provocation defence
should be construed by the judiciary in a manner which promotes
the equality-seeking protections in the Charter. The defence
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 15.
Section 27 of the Charter entitled "Multicultural heritage" states that "[this Charter
shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the
multicultural heritage of Canadians." Id. § 27. Lastly, section 28 of the Charter entitled
"Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes" provides that "[n]otwithstanding anything in
this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and
female persons." Id. § 28.
57. See, e.g., M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493
(Can.); Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.).
58. Section 32 of the Charter specifies:
(1) This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in
respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all mat-
ters relating to the Yukon Territories and Northwest Territories; and (b) to
the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters
within the authority of the legislature of each province.
Charter § 32.
59. See Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Can.).
60. Id. at 603.
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should be reformulated and applied in a manner consistent with
the fundamental principles and values of the Charter.
Application of the provocation defence should be subject to "pol-
icy parameters" informed by the equality-seeking protections of
the Charter.6 With little substantive innovation or expansion, a
racial contextualization of the provocation defence may be accom-
plished, and thus be used to inform the judge and jurors more
fully of the social reality under which a racialized accused may
have responded with fatal violence in a racially provocative con-
text.
The tightrope presented by my thesis relates to the dual re-
striction and expansion of the defence which I am advocating. In-
sults and acts, which effectively reinforce and validate the op-
pression of women, for instance, should not be sufficient to
ground the defence of provocation, for to do so is to eradicate
Charter values for equality-seeking communities. However, in-
sults and acts which effectively further oppress persons from
equality-seeking communities based upon protected grounds un-
der the Charter should be sufficient to ground the defence. For
example, acts or insults which are provocative due to the ac-
cused's sexism, racism, or homophobia or which would lead to
sexist, racist, or homophobic results should not be catalysts for
the operation of the provocation defence. Permitting such oppres-
sive use of the defence flies in the face of the spirit of the equality,
multiculturalism, and gender protections of the Charter. Acts or
insults which are provocative due to the accused bearing the bur-
den of racism, or other systemically oppressive forces, however,
may properly be seen as provocative. Hence, an oppressive out-
come versus a liberatory or emancipatory result from deployment
of the defence should be a consideration in its application. Of
course, further contextual analysis is necessitated by the reality
of overlapping identities, intersectionality, and a recognition that
people are multidimensional.62 Accordingly, the complexity of
61. While I have certain views about how the provocation defence should be changed,
it is beyond the scope of this paper for me to delve into the nature of the changes that I
would suggest. I leave that for another paper. At present, my task is merely to emphasize
that even without significant amendments the current paradigm for the defence has
reached the point in Canada where a proper contextualized investigation of racism can be
made.
62. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 371-76; Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping
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subordination must unravel the many layers of being which may
compound the oppression of a given individual.
Thus under the leading case, R. v. Hill,63 courts should consider
insults that are based upon the accused's membership in an
equality-seeking community, as defined by the Charter.64 Specifi-
cally, those insults intended to attack the accused on the basis of
gender, race, color, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, or sexual
orientation, may legitimately ground the provocation defence. In-
terestingly, a number of scholars have explored the injurious na-
ture of hate speech.65 For instance, Professor Richard Delgado
studied the implications of developing a tort of racial insult for
"words that wound."6 He stated that "[t]he failure of the legal
system to redress the harms of racism, and of racial insults, con-
veys to all the lesson that egalitarianism is not a fundamental
principle; the law, through inaction, implicitly teaches that re-
spect for individuals is of little importance."" Similarly, the Ca-
nadian legal system has failed to redress the effects of racism."
In support of permitting such insults to ground provocation, it
must be recognized that human frailty, which the defence seeks
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991); Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the
Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism
(Or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397, 401-10; Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing
the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1991). For a com-
pilation of literature on this subject generally, see CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER
(Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997) and Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Claiming" and
"Speaking" Who We Are, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL
READER 28, 28-31 (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999).
63. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
64. See Charter § 15.
65. See Okianer Christian Dark, Violence and the Mass Media: Lessons Learned From
the Battle Over "Words That Wound", 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 25 (1995); Richard
Delgado, Words That Wound. A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling,
17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words That Wound]; Richard
De]gado & Jean Stefanci, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of "A
Just Balance" Changes So Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REV. 851 (1994); Mar Matsuda, Public Re-
sponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
66. Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 65, at 141.
67. Id.
68. See generally CANADIAN COUNCIL ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, UNEQUAL ACCESS: A
CANADIAN PROFILE OF RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME
(2000), available at http://www.crr.ca/En/Publications/ePubHome.htm; REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON SYSTEMIC RACISM IN THE ONTARIO CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1997); St.
Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43.
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to recognize, is compounded by the psychological, physiological,
and economic consequences of living in a racist environment.69
III. ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION
A. "Wrongful Act"
While undoubtedly informed by moral underpinnings, the legal
concept of "wrongful act" has been described as any act which, if
considered objectively and without any regard for the peculiar
rights of the parties involved, would be "wrongful" although not
necessarily illegal.7" It is noteworthy that the wrongful act is not
one for which the actor can advance a legal right.7' Examples of
conduct found by the courts to constitute wrongful acts include a
sudden painful blow, a push, a slap to the face, an attack with a
weapon, an apprehended assault, and an uninvited homosexual
advance.72
The current scope of the "wrongful act" criteria is troubling in-
sofar as its application to uninvited homosexual advances is con-
cerned. A possible way of countering this concern is to limit the
defence to provocation caused by an "unlawful act."73 It has been
suggested that this would have a definite impact on male ac-
cuseds who kill their female partners or who claim offence from a
homosexual advance." Specifically, since neither infidelity, end-
ing a relationship, nagging, nor homosexual advances is illegal in
69. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE AwCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 62-63 (1991);
Charles R. Lawrence, II, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
70. See GRANT, supra note 37, at 6-7 to 6-9.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., R. v. Hill [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.) (uninvited homosexual advance);
Taylor v. The King, [1947] S.C.R. 462 (Can.) (slap to the face); R. v. Jackson, [19911 68
C.C.C.3d 385 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1993] 4 S.C.R. 573 (push); R. v. Demaria, [19841 1 O.A.C.
348 (Ont. C.A.) (attack with a weapon); R. v. Hansford, [1987] 33 C.C.C.3d 74 (Alta. C.A.)
(apprehended assault); R. v. Parnell, [1983] 9 C.C.C.3d 353 (Ont. C.A.) (sudden blow).
73. This suggestion is particular to the Canadian context. In particular, in the United
States, I note that adultery and sodomy are criminalized in some states. Additionally, ra-
cial slurs might be protected in the American context by the First Amendment.
74. See GRANT, supra note 37, at § 6.8; St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 8.
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Canada, resort to these actions as sufficiently insulting or wrong-
ful could no longer be legitimately made. 5
Making an unlawful act a prerequisite to provocation would
also facilitate recognition of the provocative nature of racial slurs
against persons of color. The Ontario Human Rights Commission
(the "Commission") has developed a Policy on Racial Slurs and
Harassment, and Racial Jokes76 ("Policy Statement") that inter-
prets such behavior as unlawful pursuant to the Ontario Human
Rights Code (the "Code")."7 The Code regulates private behavior,
as opposed to public behavior, which is governed by the Constitu-
tion." The Policy Statement reflects the Commission's interpreta-
tion of the Code provisions, and therefore should be considered in
conjunction with the specific provisions found therein.
The Code states that it is the public policy of Ontario to recog-
nize the inherent "dignity and worth of every person and to pro-
vide for equal rights and opportunities without discrimination."79
Additionally, the Policy Statement notes that:
Everyone has the right to live and work in an environment that is
free of demeaning comments and actions when such behaviours are
based on race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, or ethnic origin. Ra-
cial harassment through slurs, jokes or behaviour intended to de-
mean a person because of his or her race, is discriminatory. Even
when meant as a joke, racial comments are derogatory and may be
humiliating.
80
This policy sets out the Commission's interpretation of the pro-
visions of the Code relating to racial slurs, jokes, and harass-
ment." The Policy Statement defines "race" broadly to include
"race, ancestry, colour and ethnic origin." 2 Furthermore, "[iun
some circumstances, citizenship, place of origin and creed are
75. See DRESSLER, supra note 42; St. Lewis & Galloway, supra, note 43.
76. ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, POLICY ON RACIAL SLURS AND
HARASSMENT AND RACIAL JOKES (1996), available at http'//www.ohrc.on.ca
/english/publications/racial-harassment-policy.shtml (last modified Dec. 31, 1996) [herein-
after POLICY STATEMENT].
77. Human Rights Code, R.S.O. ch. H.19 (1990) (Can.) [hereinafter Human Rights
Code].
78. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 76.
79. Human Rights Code pmbl.
80. POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 76.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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linked to issues of racial discrimination and harassment."3 Har-
assment is also defined broadly in the Policy Statement. There is
specific recognition of the Code's prohibition of harassment in
employment, accommodation, services, goods, and facilities.'
Hence, racial harassment is broadly construed as unlawful pur-
suant to the Code."
As such, the fact that racial insults and abuse are not only
wrongful but also unlawful pursuant to the Code suggests that
Canadian courts may legitimately allow racist insults to ground
the defence of provocation under current law. Therefore, courts
could take into consideration the impact of insults that compound
83. Id.
84. Id. Subsection 4 of the Harassment section of the Policy Statement deals with
"General Principles."
a) Code Definition
Harassment is defined in subsection 10(1) of the Code as "engaging in a
course of vexatious comment or conduct that is known or ought reasonably to
be known to be unwelcome."
The reference to comment or conduct "that is known or ought reasonably to
be known to be unwelcome" establishes an objective test for harassment.
i. In some situations it should be obvious that the racially-based con-
duct or comments will be offensive or unwelcome.
ii. Since the individual may be in a vulnerable situation, there is no re-
quirement that the individual object to the behaviour in order for there
to be a violation of the Code. It may be unrealistic to require an indi-
vidual who is the target of harassment to object to the offensive treat-
ment as a condition of being able to claim a right to be free from such
treatment.
iii. Conduct or comments which are motivated by a person's race may
not, on their face, be offensive. However, they may still be "unwelcome"
from the perspective of a particular individual. If the individual objects
and if a similar behaviour is repeated, it may constitute a violation of
the Code.
Each situation that may be brought to the attention of the Commission
through a human rights complaint will be assessed on its own merits. How-
ever, racial epithets, comments ridiculing individuals because of race related
[sic] characteristics, religious dress, etc., or singling out an individual for hu-
miliating or demeaning "teasing" or jokes related to race, ancestry, place of
origin or ethnic origin, would in most instances be viewed as conduct or com-
ments which "ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome."
b) Comments or Conduct Need Not be Explicit
In order for the harassment provisions of the Code to apply, the comments or
conduct need not be explicitly racial in order to constitute harassment based
on race.
Id. (quoting Human Rights Code § 10(1)).
85. Id.
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the accused's experience of oppression and that are an exacerbat-
ing element within the context of systemic racism.
It is unfortunate that the "wrongful act" element is seldom
scrutinized since taking the wrongfulness of the provocative act
or insult into account could assist in furthering an equality-
seeking application of the defence. The Charter can be a compass
and guide for what is properly labeled a wrongful act or insult.
Additionally, common sense would dictate that only certain types
of behaviors are properly referred to as "wrongful" or as an "in-
sult." Recognition should be made of the dynamic nature of in-
sults and wrongful acts. For instance, although the term "Negro"
might never have been the manner in which an African-American
would ideally refer to herself in the 1950s, the term would likely
not have been as problematic then as it is considered today.86
The point has been made that:
Social attitudes towards what is wrongful and insulting do change
over time: what might have been totally offensive 100 years ago may
be tolerated today. Thus, wrongful acts or insults are essentially
fluid and open-ended in character. It is our challenge to consider how
to incorporate an understanding of the experiences of all members of
society, including members of equality-seeking communities, to en-
sure that legal rules operate without reinforcing systemic or histori-
cally discriminatory perspectives.
8 7
B. Insult
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word "insult" as,
among other things, "[an act, or the action, of attacking or assail-
ing;" or as an "open and sudden attack or assault without formal
preparations;" or as "injuriously contemptuous speech or behav-
iour; scornful utterance or action intended to wound self-respect;
86. Recall concerns over the term "Negro" used in the 2000 United States Census.
Part of the government's response has been to claim that this term is not offensive to older
blacks. See, e.g., Lyle V. Harris, On Our Own Terms; AJ.C. Southern Focus Poll: Racial
Identify, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 25, 1999, at IF.
87. St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 7 (citing Rosemary Cairns Way, The
Criminalization of Stalking: An Exercise in Media Manipulation and Political Opportun-
ism, 39 MCGML L.J. 379 (1994)).
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an affront, indignity [or] outrage" to another person." 'Wrongful"does not qualify "insult."9
It has been stated that:
[tihe traditional understanding of insult, a statement or action in-
tended to lower the dignity or embarrass another, has disturbing
breadth when one looks at... what courts have actually accepted as
"insult." Behaviours that are lawful-articulating one's rights, ex-
pressing a difference of opinion, taking a job, having relationships
with persons other than one's spouse/partner/lover, selecting one's
friends, maintaining family relationships, striking back when being
battered-are used by men to justify battering [and killing] their
partners.
90
C. "Sufficient to Deprive the Ordinary Person of Self-Control"
The objective element of section 232 is the most controversial
aspect of the provocation defence.9' Accordingly, it deserves par-
ticular attention. Using an objective test, the act or insult must
have been sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of self-
control.92 The underlying rationale for the "ordinary person" test
is to preclude an accused from relying on self-generated and self-
serving excuses. Thus, it was held in Hill that the ordinary or
reasonable person under the objective test has a "normal tem-
perament and level of self-control. It follows that the ordinary
person is not exceptionally excitable, pugnacious or in a state of
drunkenness."9 3 It has been further explained that:
[tihe test is, therefore, that of the ordinary person with those charac-
teristics of the accused that do not prevent him being, himself, a per-
son of ordinary temperament--his sex, his age, his colour, his educa-
tion, his physical condition and so on, but not those characteristics
which make his temperament, at the time, extraordinary. Fundamen-
88. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1057 (2d ed. 1989). A number of Canadian courts
have cited these definitions in the provocation context. See R. v. Thibert, [1996] 1 S.C.R.
37, 44 (Can.); R. v. Parnerkar, [1974] S.C.R. 449, 462 (Can.); R. v. Tripodi, [1995] S.C.R.
438, 445 (Can.); Taylor v. The King, [19471 S.C.R. 462, 475 (Can.).
89. See GRANT, supra note 37, § 6.2(a), at 6-9.
90. St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 8; see also GRANT, supra note 37, § 6.2(a),
at 6-8 to 6-9.
91. Criminal Code § 232.
92. Id. § 232(2).
93. R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313, 331 (Can.).
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tally, this must refer to his mental ability and his intoxication,
though there may be other such conditions.
94
In order to avoid reliance on the defence by a racist, such peo-
ple shall be characterized as "pugnacious," or "exceptionally ex-
citable," thereby ensuring that they cannot properly rely upon the
defence. Through this characterization, the racist would have
characteristics which make his temperament by definition not
that of the "ordinary person." I leave this possibility for further
study, as it is arguable whether racist views and racism generally
are, in fact, abnormal-unfortunately, they may indeed be nor-
mative.
It is important to consider the concept of the "ordinary or rea-
sonable person" and its antecedent-the "reasonable man." As so-
cial sensitivity to sexism developed, legal institutions changed the
term to "reasonable person."95 However, when the legal term of
art, the "reasonable person," was initially introduced, it was writ-
ten about men, by men. 6 Thus, criticism of the objective standard
centers around the charge that the content and character of the
"reasonable person" test has not changed and is still, essentially,
the "reasonable man" in disguise.9 Specifically, "the application
of the reasonable person test has meant that women, racial mi-
norities, lesbians, and gays have been evaluated against a stan-
dard that was not designed with them in mind and that does not
reflect their experiences and realities.""
At some point it becomes necessary, in the interest of justice, to
consider some of the attributes that an accused might not share
with the ordinary person. For example, the potentially provoca-
tive impact of the desecration of a crucifix might only be under-
stood if the ordinary person is Catholic, whereas the same event
for an agnostic or an atheist may be a matter of indifference.
Similarly, it may be pointless to ask what the effect on an ordi-
nary person would be of the desecration of the Koran, if the ordi-
nary person was not a Muslim. To fully appreciate and appropri-
94. MEWETT & MANNING, supra note 28, at 741 (emphasis added).
95. St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 11.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., id. at 12.
98. Id.
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ately consider the provocative impact of the desecration of a
synagogue, the reasonable person constructed should be Jewish.99
The difficulty posed by the traditional objective test in respond-
ing to different social realities is illustrated by the following ques-
tions:
What kind of person might be ordinary? Is the ordinary male en-
raged by a homosexual advance? Is the ordinary woman tolerant of
or enraged by unwanted heterosexual advances, sexual touchings,
misogynist statements, the display of pornography? Is she feminist
or anti-feminist? Is the ordinary white person enraged by racist
statements? The ordinary person of colour? Is the ordinary Black
woman enraged by the idea that she is fit only for domestic work or
that she has an insatiable sexual appetite? Does the ordinary male
insist on total control of his spouse so that signs of independence are
enraging? Is he enraged by infidelity or by the ending of a relation-
ship, by a physical attack? Is he committed to sex equality or not?
Are the commonplace reminders of sexual and racial hierarchies
provocation, or instead the not-so-commonplace rebellions against
inequality? Would a "nagging" wife provoke an ordinary person, but
not a racist sexual harasser? 0 0
Accordingly, the test has been criticized as unable to respond to
the social realities of each individual and for superimposing a no-
tion of abstract equality where systemic inequality is the norm. 1 '
This is precisely what may now be considered with a contextual
approach to the provocation defence and a liberal reading of exist-
ing jurisprudence. There is little standing in the way of such a re-
interpretation-nothing except judicial ignorance of these reali-
ties and societal reluctance.0 2 An examination of the case law be-
99. These hypotheticals relate only to the objective test. It may well be that the objec-
tive reasonable Catholic, for instance, would not be provoked by the offensive conduct.
Nevertheless, the construction of the reasonable person should be inclusive of such rele-
vant characteristics. Additionally, while the reasonable person constructed may allow for
the possibility of provocation, the accused may not, in fact, have been provoked by the of-
fensive conduct-this relates to the subjective test.
100. GRANT, supra note 37, § 6.2(b), at 6-12 to 6-14.
101. Id. at 6-14. See Sue Bandalli, Provocation-A Cautionary Note, 22 J.L. Socy 398
(1995); Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A
Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 435 (1981).
102. I mean no disrespect to members of our judiciary. By ignorance I mean the com-
mon dictionary definition of: "lack of knowledge, learning, information, etc." RANDOM
HousE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 952 (2d ed. 1987).
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low reveals, however, just how far the judiciary has come in con-
struing the reasonable/ordinary person. 10 3
Over the years, the objective standard of the provocation de-
fence has been expanded and modified. I wish to highlight the
manner in which the objective standard has evolved to the point
where taking the context of racism into account should no longer
present an insurmountable hurdle.
Initially, based on the House of Lords's decision in Bedder v.
Director of Public Prosecutions,"4 the courts interpreted the ob-
jective ordinary person test narrowly, disregarding the accused's
specific personal characteristics. Bedder involved a sexually im-
potent accused who killed a prostitute upon her taunting him
about his impotence.0 ° The court determined that the accused's
impotence was irrelevant to the objective test.10 6
The test applied in Bedder has been referred to as a good ex-
ample of the application of a purely objective test.' 7 While I am
reluctant to acknowledge the possibility of a standard such as
"the reasonable impotent man" in terms of stare decisis, the
House of Lords's refusal to consider any of the accused's charac-
teristics led to numerous problems in trying to construct the ordi-
nary person. 0 An act or insult may only be meaningful in light of
the particular characteristics of the accused such as race, gender,
or age. In other words, the insult or act should be considered
within the context of the objective attributes of the accused.
Taking an example from the previously mentioned case of R. v.
Olbey,10 9 calling the accused a "two-bit nigger punk"" is only
provocative if his race is considered. If the jury is not permitted to
consider characteristics such as race, gender, or age, they may ar-
rive at the erroneous conclusion that acts and insults, which are
indeed provocative, have not met the threshold ordinary person
test. Furthermore, "[ilf the 'ordinary' person is judged to have
103. See infra notes 104-22 and accompanying text.
104. [19541 2 All E.R. 801 (H.L.).
105. Id. at 801.
106. Id. at 802.
107. See STANLEY YEO, UNDERSTANDING KILLINGS AND THE LAW: PROVOCATION AND
EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENCE IN INDIA, ENGLAND, AND AUSTRALIA 60 (1998).
108. See Bedder, [1954] 2 All E.R. at 803-04.
109. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1008 (Can.). See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
110. Olbey, 11980] 1 S.C.R. at 1017.
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none of the characteristics of the accused, provocation may cease
to be very meaningful to him.""'
Recognizing some of the problems associated with a narrow ob-
jective test, the courts later rejected Bedder and opted for a
"modified objective ordinary person" test. The subjectivizing of
the objective test is a relatively recent development that began
with the House of Lords case of Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Camplin."2 The facts of this case involved the violent response of
a young man to an alleged homosexual advance."3 Lord Diplock
stated "[fl or the purposes of the law of provocation the 'reasonable
man' has never been confined to the adult male. It means an or-
dinary person of either sex, not exceptionally excitable or pugna-
cious."" '4 He later added:
[T]he reasonable man referred to in the question is a person having
the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the
sex and age of the accused, but in other respects sharing such of the
accused's characteristics as [jurors] think would affect the gravity of
the provocation to him; and that the question is not merely whether
such a person would in like circumstances be provoked to lose his
self-control but also whether he would react to the provocation as the
accused did.
1 15
Lord Simon also stated:
I think that the standard of self-control which the law requires be-
fore provocation is held to reduce murder to manslaughter is still
that of the reasonable person... but that, in determining whether a
person of reasonable self-control would lose it in the circumstances,
the entire factual situation, which includes the characteristics of the
accused, must be considered.
116
Thus, the modified objective test from Camplin allowed for con-
sideration of characteristics such as age, gender, and race, but not
factors such as ill temperament or intoxication that suggest the
accused was particularly excitable. The Supreme Court of Canada
followed Camplin in R. v. Hill,"7 the leading Canadian case.
111. MEWETr & MANNING, supra note 28, at 739.
112. [19781 A.C. 705 (H.L.).
113. Id. at 712.
114. Id. at 716-17.
115. Id. at 718.
116. Id. at 727 (emphasis added).
117. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
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In Hill, a sixteen-year-old boy killed a man after an allegedly
unwanted homosexual advance."' The Supreme Court of Canada
held that the ordinary person should be invested with those
physical attributes that have a direct bearing on the provocation
received." 9 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Dickson stated:
Indeed, it would be impossible to conceptualize a sexless or ageless
ordinary person. Features such as sex, age, or race do not detract
from a person's characterization as ordinary. Thus particular charac-
teristics that are not peculiar or idiosyncratic can be ascribed to an
ordinary person without subverting the logic of the objective test of
provocation.
120
Thus, accepting the evolution in Camplin, the Supreme Court
of Canada attempted to take into account the ordinariness of hu-
man diversity. It should be noted that Chief Justice Dickson did
not require judges to charge juries as to which of the accused's
characteristics may be imputed to the ordinary person.'2 ' Instead,
he left it to the "'collective good sense of the jury"' which he be-
lieved would naturally "lead it to ascribe to the ordinary person
any general characteristics relevant to the provocation in ques-
tion." 12 2
I do not believe justice is served by such an omission. Many
scholars have reservations about the "collective good sense" of ju-
ries for good reason. 23 A direct instruction may better equip the
118. Id. at 319-20.
119. Id. at 331.
120. Id.
12L Id. at 332.
122. Id. at 331; see also DON STUART, CANADIAN CPmInNAL LAw 495 (3d ed. 1995).
123. See Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers,
53 MD. L. REV. 107 (1994); Sophia R. Friedman, Sixth Amendment-The Right to an Im-
partial Jury: How Extensive Must Voir Dire Questioning Be? 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 920 (1992); Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury
Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative Juries of the
Hennepin Model and the Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 645 (1997);
James J. Gobert, Criminal Law: In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79. J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 269 (1988); Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A
Structural Theory of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173 (1995);
Sherrilyn A. IfiU, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation
on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a
Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1201 (1992); John W. Perloff, State v. Neil: Approaching the Desired Balance
Between Peremptory Challenges and Racial Equality in Jury Selection, 39 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 777 (1995); M.A. Widder, Comment, Neutralizing the Poison of Juror Racism: The
Need for a Sixth Amendment Approach to Jury Selection, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2311 (1993).
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jurors for their difficult tasks during deliberations. If told specifi-
cally the considerations they must weigh, jurors should be better
positioned to contemplate matters which they have perhaps never
turned their minds to in any real sense. Jury instructions aside, I
believe the more pressing and, perhaps, more complex issue re-
volves around the ability to truly select a jury of one's peers,
given the inclination of many lawyers to challenge racialized ju-
rors for cause, in an attempt to disqualify them from serving as
jurors for racialized accuseds. 124 This tendency must be consid-
ered in conjunction with venue changing motions, which often
remove trials of racialized accuseds from communities with large
populations of people of color. Larger questions are thereby cre-
ated concerning the ability of an all-white jury to apply a test that
requires them to construct and contemplate the effect of racial
abuses on the reasonable racialized person. Hence, the issue of
jury selection and jury competence is one calling for much study,
especially when matters of race are to be considered.125
In Hill, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada felt that
in cases in which the provocation is a racial slur, the jury would
think of an ordinary person as an individual with the racial back-
ground that formed the substance of the insult. 26 To this extent,
the particular characteristics which form the nexus between the
characteristic and the insult will be ascribed to the ordinary per-
son.
Chief Justice Dickson's opinion drew another important dis-
tinction:
It is important to note that, in some instances, certain characteris-
tics will be irrelevant. For example, the race of a person will be ir-
relevant if the provocation involves an insult regarding a physical
disability. Similarly, the sex of an accused will be irrelevant if the
provocation relates to a racial insult. Thus the central criterion is the
. 127
relevance of the particular feature to the provocation in question.
However, the majority's analysis in Hill failed to recognize the
reality of intersectionality. 121 "Because the intersectional experi-
124. See, e.g., Fukurai & Davies, supra note 123, at 653.
125. See, e.g., Fukurai & Davis, supra note 123, at 654; Gobert, supra note 123, at 287;
Minow, supra note 123, at 1205.
126. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 331.
127. Id. at 331-32.
128. See sources cited supra note 62 for a further discussion of intersectionality.
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ence is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis
that does not take intersectionality into account cannot suffi-
ciently address the particular manner in which Black women are
subordinated."129 Another commentator has stated that "I cannot
separate my gender from my culture: I am not a woman some-
times and Cree at others."3 °
The Court viewed characteristics such as race and gender, how-
ever, as isolated parallel factors that never intersect. 13 ' However,
"[glender as an isolated category is useful, primarily, to women
who do not encounter racial, cultural, or class-based discrimina-
tion when they participate in Canadian society"13 2 This is not re-
ality for women of color who are often subjected to various forms
of oppression because of their dual susceptibility. 3 The following
analogy illustrates this concept:
Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one
direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an in-
tersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of di-
rections and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black
woman is harmed because she is in the intersection injury could re-
sult from sex discrimination or race discrimination. 34
I would assume the above analogy holds true for women of
color generally. For example, a First Nations... woman may be
sexually abused specifically because of her race-therefore her
sex is not the only characteristic that is relevant to the provoca-
tion assessment. Calling a Mohawk woman a "squaw" or a black
woman a "whore" implicates both her race and sex in intermin-
gling and layered ways-a neat dissection of motive and import,
of cause and effect, is likely impossible or is, at least, an exercise
129. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-racist Politics,
1989 U. Cmi. LEGAL F. 130, 140 (1989).
130. Mary Ellen Turpel, Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian State
for First Nations Women, 6 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 174, 184 (1993).
131. See Hill, [1986] 1. S.C.R. at 331-32.
132. Turpel, supra note 130, at 183-84.
133. PATRIcIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 163 (1991) (The majority
analysis is ignorant of the sexual politics at work in a patriarchy whereby black women,
for example, inhabit a sex/gender hierarchy in which inequalities of race are transformed,
via sexualization, into power structures that define and confine her to the realm of sexual
animal.).
134. Crenshaw, supra note 129, at 149.
135. The term "First Nations" is the Canadian equivalent of the American term 'Native
Americans" or "American Indians."
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in futility. Clearly a court may have to take into account the fact
that the accused is a woman of color in attempting to understand
the full impact of the provocation. Similarly, a man with a
disability may be abused and provoked because he is gay or
racialized. Persons of color are frequently subjected to insulting
comments or abuse that do not implicate their race or ethnic
origin specifically because of their membership in a minority
group. Generally, today's racial harasser knows that there is
more than one way to move towards the goals of discrimination
and/or white supremacy-the "N" word and other racial epithets
are not the only way, and are perhaps some of the least effective
forms of oppression. Instead, modern practices of racial
discrimination take a multitude of forms; some more subtle or
structural, others explicit; however, all are relentless.'36
Thus, the majority test in Hill may be somewhat fanciful. The
test would require that an accused identify the basis of the insult
or wrongful act, i.e., "did he call me an idiot because of my race or
my sex? Did he spit on me because of my sex or my sexual orien-
tation?" Indeed, forcing this dissection of characteristics, this ei-
ther/or framework, reduces the analysis to the merely academic,
as it is only when engaged in legal thinking that racism and sex-
ism become distinct characteristics.'37
The full context of the oppressive reality should be assessed in
order to properly situate the insult or offensive act within the
provocation defence. Therefore, the majority decision in Hill may
not provide the courts with the best guidance, as provocative be-
havior might not relate to discrete features of identity in the
straightforward way suggested by the court.
136. A large body of scholarly work has developed around this very concept. See, e.g.,
ANATOMY OF RACISM (David Theo Goldbard ed., 1990); JODY DAVID ARMOUR,
NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM" THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN
AMERICA (1997); BENJAMIN BOWLING, VIOLENT RACISM: VICTIMIZATION, POLICING AND
SOCIAL CONTEXT (1998); MARK NATHAN COHEN, CULTURE OF INTOLERANCE: CHAUVINISM,
CLASS AND RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1998); HENRY LOUIS GATES JR. & CORNEL
WEST, THE FUTURE OF THE RACE (1996); ANDREW HACKER, TWo NATIONS: BLACK AND
WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT (Wahneema
Lubiano ed., 1997); GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: How
WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (1998); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE
COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE
HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGRESSIONS (1998).
137. See Nitya Duclos, Disappearing Women: Racial Minority Women in Human Rights
Cases, 6 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 25 (1993).
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Instead, when considering the application of the provocation
defence, courts should be required to consider the Charter as an
interpretive tool. A court could rely upon an intersecting analysis,
which would require it to recognize how the vulnerabilities of
race, sex, or sexual orientation, for example, might simultane-
ously and indivisibly interact to create the discrimination experi-
enced by the accused. Such an analysis would assist judges in fil-
tering diverging viewpoints that could and most likely would be
presented by defence counsel, prosecutors, and expert wit-
nesses.
138
1. Possible Expansion of the Objective Test
Interestingly, Madame Justice Wilson, in her dissenting
judgement in Hill, advocated expanding the objective test. 3 9 She
stated that insults do not occur in a vacuum and facts pertinent
to the individual accused need to be taken into account in assess-
ing the reaction to an insult. 4 ° Additionally, in order to conform
to reality, an insulting remark or gesture must be placed in the
specific socio-cultural context before the extent of its provocation
can be realistically assessed.' It is exactly the relevance of this
context that is the main concern of my research-how and when
can context be used to inform the provocation defence? Justice
Wilson's dissent is informative in this regard:
[T]he most appropriate formulation of the objective standard is that
of an ordinary person similarly situated and similarly insulted. The
jury must be instructed to put themselves, as the embodiment of the
ordinary person, in the accused's shoes to the extent that they per-
ceive themselves as confronted with a remark that has the same in-
sulting effect on them as the actual remark had on the accused.142
138. In playing devil's advocate with my own thesis, I recognize the potential difficulty
posed when an accused may play one "ism" off against another. What I would advocate
against, in this hypothetical, is the creation of a hierarchy of discrimination whereby race,
trumps sex, which trumps sexual orientation for instance. This is wholly unacceptable.
The defence clearly requires a nuanced appreciation of the intricacies of a diverse society
and moreover, an explicit goal of promoting the interests of a multicultural discrimination-
free society, per the Charter.
139. See Hill, [19861 1 S.C.R. 313, 345-53 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 345-46.
141. See id. at 346.
142. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
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Clearly, in order for the reasonable person to be "similarly
situated and similarly insulted" and to assess racial abuse, the
context of the reality and legacy of racism must be considered.
Surprisingly and unfortunately, the consequences on the body,
mind, and spirit of living in a world where one is subject to sys-
temic discrimination on a regular basis have largely been unex-
plored by criminal justice systems. The courts are in a pivotal role
of evaluating expert evidence in a manner that will not add to the
vulnerabilities of those who come to them seeking justice. "Only
by integrating scientific advancements with our ideals of justice
can law remain a part of the living fiber of our civilization."143
The concept of judicial notice, which obviates the formal neces-
sity for proof when the matter does not require proof, is another
avenue for expansion. According to Canadian Supreme Court
Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dube:
Judicial notice is one of the oldest doctrines in the common law and
is traceable to two ancient maxims: manifesta non indigent proba-
tione (that which is known need not be proved) and non refert quid
notum sit judici, si notum non sit in forma judicii (it matters not
what is known to a judge if it is not known in judicial form). 144
It is further pointed out that:
[Tihe judge... must be assumed to have a fund of general informa-
tion, consisting of both generalized knowledge and knowledge of spe-
cific facts, and the capacity to relate it to what he has perceived dur-
ing the proceeding, as well as the ability to draw reasonable
deductions from the combination by using the ordinary processes of
thought. That fund of general information must be at least as great
as that of all reasonably well-informed persons in the community. He
cannot be assumed to be ignorant of what is so generally accepted as
to be incapable of dispute among reasonable men.
145
Justice L'Heureux-Dube notes that in the Canadian family law
context, courts have taken judicial notice of various issues regard-
ing the disparate placement of women in Canadian society; these
issues include "economics, employment, and child care costs." 46
143. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 494 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
144. L'Heureux-Dube, supra note 24, at 462 (quoting Murl A. Larkin, Article II: Judi-
cial Notice, 30 HouS. L. REv. 193, 193 (1993)).
145. Id. at 462-63 (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269,
272 (1944)).
146. Id. at 463.
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Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of R. v.
S.(R.D.), 47 recently considered the doctrine and the spirit of judi-
cial notice in a case that touched upon racism in Nova Scotia spe-
cifically, and Canada generally." The concurring decision of Jus-
tices L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin recognize the conceptual
tension between judicial impartiality and judicial neutrality.'49
Cardozo recognized that objectivity was an impossibility because
judges, like all other humans, operate from their own perspectives.
As the Canadian Judicial Council noted in Commentaries on Judicial
Conduct... "[t]here is no human being who is not the product of
every social experience, every process of education, and every human
contact." What is possible and desirable, they note, is impartiality:
... the wisdom required of a judge is to recognize, consciously allow
for, and perhaps to question, all the baggage of past attitudes and
sympathies that fellow citizens are free to carry, untested, to the
grave.
True impartiality does not require that the judge have no sym-
pathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless be free to
entertain and act upon different points of view with an open mind.
1 50
The doctrine of judicial notice is closely linked to the common
sense and intuition of a given judge. Life experiences and per-
spectives are a valuable part of judging. Accordingly, how a judge
conceptualizes the reasonable person, even mentally as opposed
to doctrinally, is influenced by who the judge is and from where
147. [19971 3 S.C.R. 484 (Can.).
148. Id. at 484-85. The facts of the case are described as follows:
A white police officer arrested a black 15-year-old who had allegedly inter-
fered with the arrest of another youth. The accused was charged with unlaw-
fully assaulting a police officer, unlawfully assaulting a police officer with the
intention of preventing an arrest, and unlawfully resisting a police officer in
the lawful execution of his duty. The police officer and the accused were the
only witnesses and their accounts of the relevant events differed widely. The
Youth Court Judge [a black woman] weighed the evidence and determined
that the accused should be acquitted. While delivering her oral reasons, the
Judge remarked in response to a rhetorical question by the Crown, that police
officers had been known to mislead the court in the past, that they had been
known to overreact particularly with non-white groups, and that that would
indicate a questionable state of mind. She also stated that her comments
were not tied to the police officer testifying before the court. The Crown chal-
lenged these comments as raising a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Id.
149. See id. at 501-13 (L'Heureux-Dube & McLachlin, J.J., concurring).
150. Id. at 504 (quoting CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, COMENTARIES ON JUDICL t
CONDUcT 12 (1991)).
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she comes. 5' With increasing diversification of the judiciary and
increased diversity training, the typical conception and formula-
tion of the reasonable person should expand to be more reflective
of the population. As Justices L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin
further note:
[J]udges in a bilingual, multiracial and multicultural society will
undoubtedly approach the task of judging from their varied perspec-
tives. They will certainly have been shaped by, and have gained in-
sight from, their different experiences, and cannot be expected to di-
vorce themselves from these experiences on the occasion of their
appointment to the bench. In fact, such a transformation would deny
society the benefit of the valuable knowledge gained by the judiciary
while they were members of the Bar. As well, it would preclude the
achievement of a diversity of backgrounds in the judiciary. The rea-
sonable person does not expect that judges will function as neutral
ciphers; however, the reasonable person does demand that judges
achieve impartiality in their judging.
It is apparent, and a reasonable person would expect, that triers
of fact will be properly influenced in their deliberations by their indi-
vidual perspectives on the world in which the events in dispute in
the courtroom took place. Indeed, judges must rely on their back-
ground knowledge in fulfilling their adjudicative function. As David
M. Paciocco and Lee Stuesser write:
"In general, the trier of fact is entitled simply to apply common
sense and human experience in determining whether evidence is
credible and in deciding what use, if any, to make of it in coming to
its finding of fact."152
It is noteworthy that other legal forums are exploring similarly
expanded concepts of the reasonable person. 153 For instance, in
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (the "Convention") the social identity of the reason-
able person is factored into some contractual formulations of the
objective test.' The meaning of words and conduct is assessed
151. See id. at 505.
152. Id. at 505-06 (alteration in original) (quoting DAVID M. PACIOCCO & LEE
STUESSER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 277 (1996))
153. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (expanding the reasonable
person standard to the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases); Harris v.
Int'l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 n.12 (D. Me. 1991) ("The appropriate standard to
be applied in hostile environment harassment cases is that of a reasonable person from
the protected group of which the alleged victim is a member.").
154. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668-99 (1980). [hereinafter
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according to the understanding of an observer who has the social
identity of the recipient and is placed in the position of the recipi-
ent of the communication.' This socially situated reasonable
person test contained in the Convention states that the recipient
of communications in a contract dispute be "of the same kind" as
the recipient.'56 Article 8 of the Convention provides that state-
ments and conduct of contracting parties should be interpreted
according to the parties' own shared meanings; but if these can-
not be ascertained, then the statements and conduct should be in-
terpreted according to the understanding that "a reasonable per-
son of the same kind as the other party would have had in the
same circumstances." 57
Clearly, Article 8 is an attempt to contextualize contractual ne-
gotiations and to recognize alternative, but equally legitimate,
manners of approaching a contract. Representatives of developing
nations objected to provisions that would hold their traders to
"reasonable" standards or practices that had been developed
among traders from Western industrialized nations without the
participation of the developing nations."5 ' To be held to a stan-
dard to which one has had no input-a foreign standard-struck
some representatives from developing nations as existing for the
sole furtherance of Western interests.'59 The following statement
of the Mexican government succinctly illustrates this point:
[T]he subordination of... [interpretive rules] to normative and in-
terpretive usages and practices could result in the imposition of un-
fair usages and inequitable practices ... which in standard contracts
were usually laid down by the economically stronger party to the
detriment of the weaker party.
160
This has also occurred in the criminal law jurisprudential hier-
archy and power structure and has meant that certain interests
and voices are subjugated in order to further the interest of the
Convention].
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. AMY HILSMAN KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAw 139 (2d ed. 2000).
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Analysis of Replies and Comments by Government on Hague Conven-
tions of 1964, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/31 (1970) (alteration in
original)).
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stronger party-the majority-run State.'6 ' Professor Patricia Wil-
liams challenged the legal system to recognize the "deeply painful
and assaultive" nature of racism, which she has identified as
"spirit murder."62 Social science and medical expert evidence may
be used to inform the judge and jury of this racial context.163 Un-
der a "socially situated" construction of the reasonable person,
relevant evidence would include not only the history and circum-
stances of the accused in the immediate homicide investigation,
but also in society at large.164 Therefore, in order to consider the
insulting effect of racial abuses on a person of color, for example,
the legacy of such racist abuse is relevant, otherwise the assess-
ment of the provocation is undertaken in a vacuum--devoid of
any societal underpinnings and context.165
This premise is furthered by Canadian courts that have modi-
fied the "ordinary person" standard in some cases by directing ju-
ries to take into account background events in assessing whether
the provocation was sufficient to meet the objective test. A series
of appeals cases have held that the jury must consider, in relation
to the objective test, the same external pressures of insult by acts
or words as were on the accused. 166
161. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 101-78 (1999) (discussing jury discrimination and selective prosecution);
FRANTz FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 35-106 (1963) (discussing the supresssion
and psychological turmoil that Western colonialism has caused the colonized and how vio-
lence has been used to effect change); HACKER, supra note 136, at 3-64 (explaining why
many black Americans "define [their] citizenship as partial and qualified"); BRUCE
WRIGHT, BLACK ROBES, WHITE JUSTICE 61-146 (1987) (discussing the role that judges
play in racism).
162. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpoint-
ing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129 (1987) (explaining that
the jury should consider "the external events which triggered the accused for the violent
reaction").
163. See generally Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based Upon the
Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black
Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731, 774-80 (1996) (discussing examples of social science and medi-
cal studies of racism).
164. R. v. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 508 (Can.) (L'Heureux-Dube & McLachlin, J.J.,
concurring) (explaining that the reasonable person possesses knowledge of the history of
discrimination in his or her community).
165. For an example of this phenomenon, see Omar Saleem, The Ages of Unreason: The
Impact of Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and
Frisk," 50 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 486-87 n.242 (1997) (criticizing the United States Supreme
Court for treating racism as an isolated event committed by only a few deviant individu-
als).
166. See R. v. Desveaux, [1986] 26 C.C.C.3d 88, 96 (Ont. C.A.) (explaining that the jury
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In R. v. Daniels,'67 Appellate Justice Laycraft held that the
trial judge should instruct the jury to consider all of the external
events putting pressure on the accused. 6 ' The Supreme Court of
Canada approved this case and its underlying reasoning.'69 Ac-
cordingly, Daniels is instructive and indicates the validity of a
contextual approach to the provocation defence, as follows:
The purpose of the objective test prescribed by S. 215 [now sec-
tion 232] is to consider the actions of the accused in a specific case
against the standard of the ordinary person. Hypothetically, the or-
dinary person is subjected to the same external pressures of insult by
acts or words as was the accused. Only if those pressures would
cause an ordinary person to lose self-control does the next question
arise whether the accused did, in fact, lose self-control. In my view,
the objective test lacks validity if the reaction of the hypothetical or-
dinary person is not tested against all of the events which put pres-
sure on the accused.
The requirement for suddenness of insult and reaction does not
preclude a consideration of past events. The incident which finally
triggers the reaction must be sudden and the reaction must be sud-
den but the incident itself may well be coloured and given meaning by
a consideration of events which preceded it. Indeed, one could imag-
ine a case in which a given gesture, in itself innocuous, could not be
perceived as insulting unless the jury was aware of previous events.
They disclose the nature, depth and quality of the insult.
170
Thus, jurisprudentially, the application of the objective test
may include all of the events that put pressure on the accused
and gave meaning to the final triggering act or insult Racial
abuses are but one example of such events. Similarly, sexual
abuses and the abuses perpetrated because of homophobia may
give meaning to ultimately fatal violence, which occurs in re-
sponse to oppressive forces bearing down upon the accused. While
Daniels and the other two appeals cases cited were decided prior
to Hill, the Supreme Court of Canada did not disapprove them.
should consider the history of tensions and pressures between the victim and accused); R.
v. Conway, [1985] 17 C.C.C.3d 481, 487 (Ont. C.A-) (explaining that the jury should con-
sider "an ordinary man who had experience the same series of acts or insults as experi-
enced by the appellant"); R. v. Daniels, [1983] 7 C.C.C.3d 542, 554 (N.W.T.C.A.).
167. [19831 7 C.C.C.3d 542 (N.W.T.CA-).
168. Id. at 554.
169. See R. v. Thibert, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 37, 48 (Can.); R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313, 330
(Can.).
170. Daniels, 7 C.C.C.3d at 554 (emphasis added).
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The analysis found in the above mentioned cases is helpful in
my advocacy for an appreciation of racial context and contextuali-
zation generally. Consideration of a racial slur or assault should
be grounded in the reality of other "external pressures" including
the context of racism, if relevant. Similarly, the events putting
pressure on a person of color may include his or her context of
suffering racist abuses and racial micro-aggressions"71 -th is
especially relevant when the caselaw speaks of a final triggering
act or insult.172 A racial epithet hurled at a racialized person may
produce a violent reaction for any number or reasons, including
the outrage and anger evoked from an accumulation of racial as-
saults and abuses.7 3 Of course, this is not the ideal reaction, nor
is it the only reaction.' 74 However, a violent reaction should not be
surprising in situations where racism has created a particularly
tense and volatile context, 7 ' such as the Smithers fact pattern. 76
Recall that consideration of human frailty was meant to prevent
the simple assumption of malice in all circumstances of murder.'77
One such human frailty involves the claim that the accused has
been provoked into committing the act. Accordingly, a "thin-
skulled"178 accused who is subjected to racial taunting may
171. Peggy Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565 (1989) (explaining
that microaggressions are the "'subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal ex-
changes which are 'put downs' of blacks by offenders" (quoting Chester M. Pierce et al., An
Experiment in Racism: TV Commercials, in TELEVISION AND EDUCATION 66 (Chester M.
Pierce, ed. 1978)).
172. See cases cited supra note 166.
173. See Falk, supra note 163, at 752-55.
174. See generally IAN FRAZIER, ON THE REZ (2000) (portraying the American Indians
and how they have survived through toughness and humor). Thank you to Professor Sid-
ney Watson for referring me to this book.
175. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680, 716 (1995) (arguing that black criminals should
not be punished for retributive purposes because their crime is a predictable reaction to
pervasive racial subordination and white supremacy); see also PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RACE
CONFRONTS THE LAW (1997) (arguing for diminished capacity defense against criminal li-
ability for crimes by black defendants committed in the heat of "black rage" caused by liv-
ing in discriminatory environment).
176. See R. v. Smithers, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 506 (Can.); supra notes 2-16 and accompany-
ing text.
177. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
178. The tort law concept of the "thin skull" plaintiff is a traditional part of negligence
theory and application. It has been held that the reasonable foreseeability test instructs
that a tortfeasor "takes his victim as he finds him." Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., [1962] 2
Q.B. 405, 414 (Eng.).
In Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., spattering molten metal burned a workman's lip. Id. at
408. The burn triggered the development of cancer at a place where the plaintiff had pre-
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manifest the very type of human frailty for which the defence was
created.
In a recent decision, R. v. Thibert,'79 the majority of the Su-
preme Court of Canada reviewed the jurisprudence on the ordi-
nary person standard and concluded: "[i]f the test is to be applied
sensibly and with sensitivity, then the ordinary person must be
taken to be of the same age, and sex, and must share with the ac-
cused such other factors as would give the act or insult in question
a special significance."180
The majority in Thibert relies on the following passage from
the appellate court decision in R. v. Conway:8'
[The trial judge] should have told [the jury] present acts or insults,
in themselves insufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose self-
control, may indeed cause such loss of self-control when they are con-
nected with past events and external pressures of insult by acts or
words and accordingly in considering whether an ordinary man
would have lost self-control they must consider an ordinary man who
had experienced the same series of acts or insults as experienced by
the appellant. 182
I would suggest that this language, referencing a series of acts
or insults, could be interpreted as recognizing the existence of
cumulative provocation generally, and the possibility of cumula-
tive racist provocation specifically. Such provocation occurs over
time and does not originate merely from one provocative incident.
Rather, numerous insults and wrongful acts from numerous
sources and abusers may accumulate over time to become the
proverbial "straw that breaks the camel's back."
malignant cancerous tissues. Id. The workman died from this cancer three years later and
his wife sued his employer. Id. Lord Chief Justice Parker chose to preserve the thin-skull
plaintiff rule and stated that:
The test is not whether these employers could reasonably have foreseen that
a burn would cause cancer and that he would die. The question is whether
these employers could reasonably foresee the type of injury he suffered,
namely, the burn. What, in the particular case, is the amount of damage
which he suffers as a result of that burn, depends on the characteristics and
constitution of the victim.
Id. at 415.
179. [19961 1 S.C.R. 37 (Can.).
180. Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added).
181. [19851 17 C.C.C.3d 481 (Ont. C.A.).
182. Thibert, [1996] 1 S.C.R. at 48-49 (quoting Conway, 17 C.C.C.3d at 487) (emphasis
added).
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In the domestic setting, cumulative provocation typically in-
volves a course of cruel or violent conduct on the part of the de-
ceased over a substantial period of time.'83 This conduct may cul-
minate in the victim of the cruel behavior intentionally killing
their tormentor.8 4 Reliance is then placed on the whole course of
conduct as a basis for the legal defence of provocation (rather
than a single, more serious provoking event occurring immedi-
ately before the killing).'85 In such cases the conduct of the ac-
cused immediately before the murder, if viewed in isolation, may
seem relatively minor.'86 However, if the incident is viewed in the
context of previous cumulative abuses, it may elucidate the ac-
cused's response to the deceased's act or insult.
8 7
Serial or cumulative provocation is the context which concerns
me the most. It is at this juncture that the cumulative impact of
racism becomes relevant. An isolated racial epithet may seem
trivial, but may have added significance as a provocative catalyst
when assessed in light of longstanding cumulative provocation in
the form of systemic, structural, and direct or indirect racism.
A plea of provocation is conceptually able to cover not only single,
stand-on-their-own provoking events but also the cumulative effects
of a pattern of objectionable provocative behaviour directed towards
the defendant. To date, Canadian law has narrowly interpreted
provocation to consist in a single "sudden" or "immediate" provoking
event, but there is no reason why the idea of provocation need be so
confined. 188
Accordingly, I would suggest that "contextualization" of the
provocation defence is the next logical step in the evolution of the
defence if any relevant racial context is to be appreciated.
2. Contextualization
Contextualization as an approach places the crime, including
183. See Martin Wasik, Cumulative Provocation and Domestic Killing, 1982 CRIM. L.
REV. 29, 29 (1982).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Brenda M. Baker, Provocation as a Defence for Abused Women Who Kill, 11 CAN.
J.L. & JuRis. 193, 195 (1998).
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the insult or offensive conduct, in societal context and attempts to
deconstruct any prejudices and assumptions at work.18 9 Expert
evidence should be admissible as to such context. I leave for fur-
ther and later exploration the exact types of evidence which may
properly inform the record at trial. Some will undoubtedly have
concerns with the necessary expansion of trials that would take
place if contextualization occurs. My response is simply to high-
light the educative role of the justice system and to have faith in
the ability of a judge to control her docket and the administration
of justice, yet simultaneously strive to have herself and the jury
properly and fully informed. We must err on the side of justice,
not administrative expediency.
190
Judicial inquiry into the factual, social, and psychological "con-
text provides the requisite background for the interpretation and
the application of the law."'9 ' The Supreme Court of Canada has
recently had occasion to expound upon this point, and the concur-
ring opinion in R. v. S. (R.D.) makes the point that a conscious,
contextual inquiry is a necessary part of any judicial inquiry.'92
An understanding of the context or background essential to judg-
ing may be gained from testimony from expert witnesses in order to
put the case in context: ... from academic studies properly placed
before the Court; and from the judge's personal understanding and
experience of the society in which the judge lives and works. This
process of enlargement is not only consistent with impartiality; it may
also be seen as its essential precondition.
A reasonable person far from being troubled by this process,
would see it as an important aid to judicial impartiality.1 9
3
189. See supra note 23. See generally Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing
Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 17 (1998) (addressing contextualization of
sexual harassment).
190. See Singh v. Minister of Emp. & Immigr., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 179-80 (overruled
on other grounds) (granting appellant's demand for due process in immigration hearings,
despite increased administration, because to do otherwise would be counter to Charter
section 7 protections of fundamental freedoms). Section 7 of the Charter guarantees that
"everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Charter
§ 7.
191. R. v. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 507 (Can.) (L'Heureux-Dube & McLachlin, J.J.,
concurring).
192. Id at 506.
193. Id. at 507 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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The notion that social conditions influence criminal behavior is
certainly not new; this approach is consonant with a broad litera-
ture documenting the effects of adverse conditions on the inci-
dence of crime.'94 With this approach it is permissible to take into
account characteristics such as ethnic and racial identity, sex,
language, or physical infirmity, among other characteristics of an
accused.'95 Furthermore, the context of any systemically oppres-
sive factors relevant to those characteristics may be considered
for the purpose of properly situating the insult or wrongful act.196
To do otherwise is to do a disservice to the objective test because
ordinary people do, in fact, come from all walks of life.
The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to cir-
cumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhab-
ited by the hypothetical "reasonable man."' 97 If it strains credulity
to imagine what the "ordinary white man" would do in the posi-
tion of a black man bombarded with racial slurs, it is probably be-
cause white men do not typically find themselves in that situa-
tion. Some blacks do, however.
Contextualization would assume that the reasonable person
would or should have knowledge of and behave consistently with
194. One of the first criminal cases involving a "rotten social background" defence was
United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The black defendant killed a
white marine after an altercation involving racial epithets directed at him. Id. at 928-29.
The defendant claimed he acted from an irresistible impulse caused by racism and eco-
nomic deprivation he experienced as a child which caused him to hate white people. Id. at
957-58 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). At trial, the defence was denied on the ground that,
regardless of whether defendant's background contributed to his actions, it had not ren-
dered him mentally incompetent at the time of the crime. Id. at 968 (McGowan, J.) In his
dissent, Judge Bazelon asserted that a rotten social background had deprived the defen-
dant of control over his actions even if he remained sane at the time of the crime. Id. at
959 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon further articulated his viewpoint in an arti-
cle that sparked scholarly debate over these issues. See David L Bazelon, The Morality of
the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 403 (1976). But see Steven J. Morse, The Twi-
light of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976).
For additional discussion of this issue, see Falk, supra note 163, at 736-37 (arguing that
socially toxic factors, such as racism, poverty, and crime can so accumulate upon particu-
lar individuals as to cause criminal and other dysfunctional behavior). See generally
NORVAL MORRIS, MADNEss AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (1982) (discussing mental illness and
the criminal justice system).
195. See Falk, supra note 163, at 733-34.
196. See id. at 752-57.
197. This framework is borrowed from the reasoning of Justice Wilson in R. v. Lavallee,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, 874 (Can.). Justice Wilson reasoned that it is hard to imagine what
"an ordinary man" would do if he was a battered spouse because it is women who are most
often in these situations. Id.
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the Charter.9 ' Thus, in addition to setting out the requirements
of the Criminal Code, a judge would make specific reference to
the Charter and the right of all persons to be free from discrimi-
nation on its enumerated and analogous grounds.'99 Further, the
charge to the jury would state that the reasonable person is pre-
sumed to hold Charter values or to be aware of these legal stric-
tures. Again there is an inherent tension implicit in this thesis. I
suggest that the racial victimization of the accused could be taken
into account as potentially mitigating, but not the accused's ra-
cism, as this would fall outside of the equality-seeking parame-
ters and, therefore, be contrary to Charter values. A commitment
towards ending all forms of discrimination should inform, if not
drive, the use of the defence in a manner which promotes the
spirit of the Charter.
The defence of provocation should be governed by an equality
analysis that permeates the "ordinary person" test. The court
could take judicial notice that knowledge of and commitment to
the Charter and its values is an essential feature of the reason-
able person.
The reasonable person .... is an informed and right-minded member
of the community, a community which, in Canada, supports the fun-
damental principles entrenched in the Constitution by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Those fundamental principles in-
clude the principles of equality set out in s. 15 of the Charter and en-
dorsed in nationwide quasi-constitutional provincial and federal hu-
man rights legislation. The reasonable person must be taken to be
aware of the history of discrimination faced by disadvantaged groups
in Canadian society protected by the Charter's equality provisions.
These are matters of which judicial notice may be taken. In
Parks,... Doherty J.A., did just this, stating:
"Racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is a part of our
community's psyche. A significant segment of our community
holds overtly racist views. A much larger segment subcon-
sciously operates on the basis of negative racial stereotypes.
Furthermore, our institutions, including the criminal justice
system, reflect and perpetuate those negative stereotypes."200
Thus, behaviors that are motivated by hatred, fear, or the
198. See S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 507-08 (L'Heureux-Dube & McLachlin, J.J., con-
curring).
199. See id.
200. Id. (quoting R. v. Parks, [1993] 15 O.R.3d 324, 342 (Ont. C.A.)).
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stereotypes of persons entitled to protection under the Charter
would be, by definition, unreasonable, pugnacious, or tempera-
mental and, thus, unacceptable. Therefore, the reasonable person
is not racist, sexist nor homophobic, just as the reasonable person
is not excitable nor idiosyncratic. As the concurring opinion in R.
v. S. (R.D.) observed:
We conclude that the reasonable person.., endorsed by Canadian
courts is a person who approaches the question.., with a complex
and contextualized understanding of the issues in the case. The rea-
sonable person understands the impossibility of judicial neutrality,
but demands judicial impartiality. The reasonable person is cogni-
zant of the racial dynamics in the local community, and, as a member
of the Canadian community, is supportive of the principles of equal-
ity.
20 1
To allow a reasonable person to hold racist, sexist, or homo-
phobic beliefs and to be provoked by such discriminatory tenden-
cies would be to allow peculiar or idiosyncratic characteristics
into the objective standard. Thus the addition of parameters pre-
venting utilization of Charter-infringing remarks and actions,
versus defensive reactions, as catalysts for the defence may be
possible. °2
This defensive-offensive dichotomy may prove helpful in de-
lineating the tightrope between a defensive reaction to discrimi-
natory behavior and invective on the one hand, and the ramifica-
tions of offensive discrimination on the other. Offensive
discrimination sanctions and reinforces existing prejudicial power
structures, subjugating already marginalized communities. This
conduct has been explicitly prohibited in Hill."3
Moreover, a contextual approach would have very specific con-
sequences for men who try to avail themselves of the defence of
provocation in circumstances where women were expressing their
201. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
202. Acceptance of the expansion of the provocation defence for racial contextualization
does not necessarily require acceptance of a corresponding restriction of the defence where
it may be utilized by persons operating under oppressive ideologies, such as racism or sex-
ism. Indeed, one might believe that mitigation for human frailty should include mitigation
for people harmed by experiences of racism, and also for people who are the product of a
culture which prescribes acceptance of oppressive ideologies. Some may prescribe to the
"eye for an eye" philosophy whereby the provocation defence should be accessible to vic-
tims of racism and sexism as well as racists and sexists, for example.
203. R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313, 331-35 (Can.).
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autonomy or desire to leave a relationship or where the accused
was subjected to a homosexual advance. Specifically, the Charter
prohibits discrimination based upon the enumerated grounds of
gender discrimination and the analogous ground of sexual orien-
tation. °4 Insults based on such views should not ground the
provocation defence. Further, as women's assertions of autonomy
and a homosexual advance are not unlawful, they should not pro-
vide a defence to murder. For instance, the "gay panic" defence
attempted last year in the trial of one of the men accused of fa-
tally beating Matthew Shepard, a gay Wyoming college student,
should similarly be rejected as prohibited by the Charter. °5
The reasonable person standard articulated in R. v. S.(R.D.)
takes the analysis one step further. The concurring decision ar-
guably supports the proposition that not only is the reasonable
person not a racist, but he or she is assumed to have knowledge of
the reality of racism and oppression.2 °6
The reasonable person is not only a member of the Canadian com-
munity, but also, more specifically, is a member of the local commu-
nities in which the case at issue arose (in this case, the Nova Scotian
and Halifax communities). Such a person must be taken to possess
knowledge of the local population and its racial dynamics, including
the existence in the community of a history of widespread and sys-
temic discrimination against blacks and aboriginal people, and high
profile clashes between the police and the visible minority population
over policing issues. The reasonable person must thus be deemed to
be cognizant of the existence of racism in Halifax, Nova Scotia. It fol-
lows that judges may take notice of actual racism known to exist in a
particular society. Judges have done so with respect to racism in
Nova Scotia. [It has been noted that:] "[Racism] is a pernicious real-
ity. The issue of racism existing in Nova Scotia has been well docu-
mented in the Marshall Inquiry Report. A person would have to be
stupid, complacent or ignorant not to acknowledge its presence, not
only individually, but also systemically and institutionally."
20 7
At this point it should be pointed out that Canadian courts
have accepted contextualization in other criminal law defences.20 8
204. Charter § 28; see also cases cited supra note 57.
205. For information on the Matthew Shepard trial see McKinney Guilty of Murder:
Death Penalty Possible for Shepard Slaying, at http://more.abnews.go.com/sections/us/
dailynews/shepard verdict.html (Nov. 3, 2000).
206. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 508 (L'Heureux-Dube & McLachlin, J.J., concurring).
207. Id. at 508-09 (quoting N.S. Minster Cmty. Servs. v. S.M.S., [1992] 110 N.S.R.2d
91, 108 (Farn. Ct.)) (emphasis added).
208. See R v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.).
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The law of self-defence has tended to infuse the reasonable person
with the characteristics of the accused, and to examine the cir-
cumstances and contexts in which the accused found them-
selves." 9 Specifically, Canadian courts have recognized the plight
of women in situations of domestic violence and have recognized
battered woman syndrome and evidence of the legacy and history
of abuse as relevant to construing the "reasonable person" in this
context.21°
An extension of this sort has already taken place in Canada's law of
self defence where both a woman's gender and her experience of con-
tinued abuse are considered to be central in determining the reason-
ableness of her belief in the need for self defence. The 1994 Govern-
ment Consultation Paper called for a reformed defence of provocation
which showed compassion for women by reducing a murder charge to
manslaughter when "provoked by prolonged and severe domestic
abuse or oppression," acknowledging the "slow-building effects of
such abuse."
Such contextual consideration may necessitate the allowance of
expert testimony to elucidate the reality of racism. In R. v.
Lavallee,212 Madame Justice Wilson, writing for the majority, rec-
ognized the need for expert assistance in appreciating a context
that may be foreign to the average juror.213
The need for expert evidence in these areas can, however, be obfus-
cated by the belief that judges and juries are thoroughly knowledge-
able about "human nature" and that no more is needed. They are, so
to speak, their own experts on human behaviour.... Expert evidence
on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners must, it seems to me, be both relevant and necessary in the
context of the present case. How can the mental state of the appel-
lant be appreciated without it?
214
209. See R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313, 331-32 (Can.).
210. For the first time the Supreme Court of Canada contextualized woman battering
in Lavallee. In this landmark case, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the "battered
woman syndrome," whereby expert testimony was admissible to establish the reasonable-
ness of the accused's belief regarding the need for self-defensive action. Lavallee, [1990] 1
S.C.R. at 882.
211. Baker, supra note 188, at 195 (quoting CRIM. L. POL'Y SEC., CAN. DEP'T OF JUST.,
REFORMING CRIMINAL CODE DEFENCES: PROVOCATION, SELF-DEFENCE AND DEFENCE OF
PROPERTY: A CONSULTATION PAPER (1998)) [hereinafter CONSULTATION PAPER].
212. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.).
213. See id. at 871.
214. Id.
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Courts need help to understand the psychological effects of ra-
cism, battering, homophobia, and other "-isms." This help is avail-
able to courts from trained professionals. As the Lavallee Court
noted in regard to this type of testimony in battering cases:
It is aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of the
jury may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors' logic, drawn
from their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion,
an area where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disre-
gard their prior conclusions as being common myths rather than
common knowledge.
215
Common misperceptions about the existence of racism make
Justice Wilson's comments equally applicable to the contextuali-
zation of the provocation defence. Knowledge of racism, its mani-
festations, and ramifications is similarly beyond the ken of the
average juror. Additionally, the unpopularity of notions such as
cumulative provocation, fear of the slippery slope, and flood-gate
concerns likely necessitate the introduction of social science evi-
dence to educate judges and jurors about this relevant racial con-
text.
The stress induced by racism operates on at least two levels: (1) a
system-wide derogation of members of the minority group, and (2)
the personal experiences of the individual. Often, it is the cumulative
impact of both types of stresses that is so destructive and explains
why one precipitating event may seem trivial yet causes the individ-
ual acute distress. The response to this stress is not the same for all
black persons. Individual differences in responsiveness to the
stresses produced by racism have been explored only slightly. Some
factors implicated in vulnerability to racism include degree of com-
munity support, personality, and attitudes.
216
3. The Context of Cumulative Provocation
"This frustration with the whites," Ola said, thoughtfully, and not re-
sponding to her smile, "is a natural reaction to what they have, collec-
215. Id. at 873 (quoting State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984)).
216. Falk, supra note 163, at 778 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Joe R.
Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places,
56 AM. Soc. REV. 101, 114-15 (1991); Jeanne Spurlock, Black Americans, in CROSS-
CULTuRAL PSYCHIATRY 165 (Albert Gaw ed., 1982) ("The foregoing accounts of psychologi-
cal assaults daily mar the mental health of Black people. Some will 'veather the storm.'
Some will break down.").
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tively, done to you, not simply as an individual, but as a people, a cul-
ture, a race. The instinct for self-defence and self-preservation is in-
nate. "
2 17
The above passage is from the novel The Temple of My Famil-
iar by Alice Walker. In addressing his daughter's fear that she
will murder whites, Ola, one of the main characters, touches upon
a very real phenomenon: at times the pressure of living in an op-
pressive society (that is in a constant state of denial), might be
too much to bear. Currently there are no criminal defences that
would explicitly allow for this reality. The defence of provocation
is one possible avenue for exploration of these issues.
At its core, what pushes the margins with my proposal is not
the emphasis on expanding the relevant considerations for the ob-
jective test. The novel element is that this expansion includes an
appreciation of serial or cumulative provocation.
[Riacism is stressful for the persons subjected to it. The stress for
minority group members induced by racism is greater than that ex-
perienced by other members of society, a phenomenon Cash terms
"extra-dimensional systemic frustrations." The result of stress are
fairly well-known. As one commentator opined, "In the case of
Blacks, extrapsychic sources of stress often lead to intrapsychic mal-
adaptive behavior, that is, poor self-concept, feelings of hopelessness,
and rage."
2 18
Unlike the case law addressing "battered woman's syndrome,"
which focuses on the cumulative abuse inflicted by one batterer
upon the accused woman, the distinction which I am advocating
would critically examine the role, if relevant, of "serial abuse" lev-
217. ALICE WALKER, THE TEMPLE OF MY FAMILIAR 316 (1989).
218. Falk, supra note 163, at 777-78 (citations omitted). For further information on the
serious health concerns brought about by racism, see id. at 774 nn.234-36. See also
Feagin, supra note 216, at 115 ("The individual cost of coping with racial discrimination is
great and, as he says, you cannot accomplish as much as you could if you retained the en-
ergy wasted on discrimination."); Harold W. Neighbors, Clinical Care Update: Minori-
ties/ The Prevention of Psychopathology in African Americans: An Epidemiologic Perspec-
tive, 26 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 167, 167 (1990) ("Many have argued that stressful
social conditions are the major cause of mental disorder in blacks and thus, psychopa-
thology can be prevented by eliminating racism, oppression and poor economic condi-
tions."). Neighbors further notes that it is commonly assumed that blacks experience more
stress than whites because of discrimination and prejudice. Id. For an older, but still im-
portant, exploration of this theme, see Charles A. Pinderhughes, Understanding Black
Power: Processes and Proposals, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1552, 1554 (1969) (noting the
"chronic external conflict and distress" suffered by black individuals who experience a
"flood of unpredictable stimuli" and find the culture a constant threat).
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ied at the accused by a number of abusers over time. In this sce-
nario, such abuse may render the next abusive contact the pro-
verbial "last straw."
It is the transformation of this quantum of grief into aggression
of which we now speak. As a sapling bent low stores energy for a vio-
lent backswing, blacks bent double by oppression have stored energy
which will be released in the form of rage-black rage, apocalyptic
and final.219
Such recognition of "serial provocation" would better appreciate
the reality of racist abuses. Unlike the case of the battered
woman who might be in a longstanding relationship with her
abuser, victims of racism are bombarded by various abuses from
many different persons and sources. If the accused is a black per-
son who has been the victim of routine racist microaggressions,22 °
the racist act or racist insult should be situated in the context of
such racism. Psychiatrists who have studied black populations
view such microaggressions as "incessant and cumulative" as-
saults on black self-esteem." 1 Racism affects mental well-being,
in addition to causing stress, by compromising the self-concept of
the person subjected to racial abuses. If racism is premised upon
the notion of racial superiority, it is no wonder that one sequela is
self-contempt on the part of some racialized persons."' As one
group of authors has poignantly noted: "What is it like to be a
black person in white America today? One step from suicide! ...
[Ilt's really a mental health problem. It's a wonder we haven't all
gone out and killed somebody or killed ourselves."223
Within the context of systemic racial abuses there may be cir-
cumstances that mitigate the "innocence" of the victim. These are
considerations that must be explored in order to fully appreciate
any underlying or background information that gives context to
violence which may result from the context of racial abuses.
219. WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE E. COBBS, BLACK RAGE 210 (1968).
220. See Davis, supra note 171, at 1560; Chester Pierce et al., An Experiment in Ra-
cism: TV Commercials, in TELEVISION AND EDUCATION 62, 66 (Chester Pierce ed. 1978);
Chester Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF
PSYCMIATRY 512 (Silvane Arieti ed., 2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter Pierce, Psychiatric Problems
of the Black Minority].
221. Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, supra note 220, at 515.
222. Falk, supra note 163, at 778; see Williams, supra note 162, at 141.
223. JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LivING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-
CLASS EXPERIENCE vii (1994).
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The multifaceted nature of psychological dysfunction engen-
dered by racism, only one aspect of which is rage, is one reason
that the sobriquet "black rage" is not only unduly provocative, but
also inaccurate. A better term might be the one suggested by Ag-
grey Burke--"racism-related disorder."1
24
If the law does not acknowledge serial racial abuses, the reality
of the cumulative impact of racism will continue to be ignored in
the criminal defence setting. It is precisely this context, if rele-
vant, that should be taken into account upon a reexamination of
the earlier discussed cases of R. v. Smithers25 and R. v. Olbey.226
a. Smithers v. The Queen227
Recall Paul Smithers, the young black hockey player who was
taunted with racial slurs throughout a game and later killed one
of his taunters. The court's reasoning did not discuss the issue
and impact of the racial slurs and abuses on the behavior of the
accused. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada characterized the
principle issue as "whether the appellant had committed homi-
cide by directly or indirectly, by any means, causing the death of
Cobby and whether such homicide was culpable for the reason
that it was caused by an unlawful act."229 Provocation was
deemed not to be a factor and was dismissed by the court. 23 ° This
is evident from the Court's statement that "the appellant alone
was the aggressor. He relentlessly pursued Cobby some forty-five
minutes later for the purpose of carrying out his threats to 'get'
Cobby."231
Regardless of whether this forty-five minute time lag was suffi-
cient to undermine fulfillment of the "on the sudden"22 require-
224. Falk, supra note 163, at 774 (quoting Aggrey W. Burke, Is Racism a Causatory
Factor in Mental Illness?, 30 INT'L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (1984)); see also Joe Ravetz,
Ethnicity, Race and Mental Health, 8 SOC. WORK EDUC. 37, 38 (1989).
225. [1978] S.C.R. 506 (Can.).
226. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1008 (Can.).
227. For the earlier discussion of Smithers, see supra notes 2-16 and accompanying
text.
228. Smithers, [1978] S.C.R. at 508-09.
229. Id. at 515.
230. Id. at 522.
231. Id.
232. Crimnal Code § 232(2).
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ment, the Court should have seriously addressed the provocative
context within which the murder was committed. The Court did
not examine the racially charged atmosphere, nor the fact that
during the game the accused was bombarded with racial abuses
from multiple sources in the form of verbal insults and threats.
No mention was made that Smithers was subjected to "goon tac-
tics" on the ice, nor was any examination undertaken of what he
might have been subjected to as one of the few black hockey play-
ers.2 13 I do not mean to suggest that these racial abuses should
have been completely exculpatory, but had the provocation de-
fence been a consideration, the context of racist abuse would have
been relevant to the analysis of the case. Greater scrutiny of the
terms "nigger" and the history of the deployment of this epithet
would have, at the least, situated this slur as a wrongful act or
insult-the catalyst for provocation. Therefore, the objective black
man similarly situated should have been considered insofar as
the deprivation of self-control was concerned. The third crite-
rion-the subjective test-would likely have been made out on
the facts.
b. Olbey v. The Queen234
At the accused's trial for murder, one of the Crown prosecution
witnesses testified that she heard the deceased call the accused a
"two-bit nigger punk."" After this statement, the witness testi-
fied that there was an argument and that four or five minutes
later she heard shots fired.236 These shots killed the deceased.237
233. Smithers, [19781 S.C.R. at 506-08. Racial issues in professional hockey have been
addressed in news reports over the past several years. See Andrew Campbell, NHL Must
Address the Racism Issue, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 26, 1990, at A16; Housley's Day Marred by
Incident; Racial Remarks Spoil 1,000th Point, HOUSTON CHRON. Nov. 9, 1997, at 14;
Sharon Raboin, After Second Slur, Caps Get Sensitivity Training, USA TODAY, Nov. 26,
1997, at 13C; Racial Incident Follows Caps' 2-1 Win, BALT. SUN, Nov. 9, 1997, at 14C;
Tampa Players Accused of Racial Slurs, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 7, 1998, at D2.
234. For the earlier discussion of Olbey, see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
235. R.v. Olbey, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1008, 1012 (Can.).
236. Id. at 1016-17.
237. Id. at 1017.
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The Supreme Court of Canada again dismissed the provocative
context, as it had done in Smithers, and ignored the reality of rac-
ist abuses."' Speaking for the majority Justice McIntyre held:
I have read the evidence with care and find it difficult to reach a con-
clusion that there was any evidence of a wrongful act or insult of
such nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the
power of self-control. Further, I was unable to find any evidence that
the accused acted on the sudden before his passion cooled.239
Later in the case the Court stated that "[iun this case, there was
little if any evidence to support the proposition that provocation
had been given."24°
Clearly the Supreme Court used an objective standard that
was devoid of any racial context in reaching its conclusion. In de-
termining that there was no provocation from the racial epithet,
the Court failed to recognize the clear nexus between the insult
and the relevant characteristic-race. In this case, even a simple
infusion of the ordinary person in keeping with the basic ap-
proach employed in Hill would have been sufficient.
c. Parnerkar v. The Queen
In R. v. Parnerkar,241 the accused, charged with the non-capital
murder of Anna Mazeros, was convicted of manslaughter on the
verdict of the jury.242 The Crown appealed, claiming that there
was no evidence of a wrongful act or insult within the meaning of
the provocation defence.243
The accused met the deceased after he emigrated from India,
and the two had been on friendly terms for a number of years.2"
Their relationship cooled, but the two remained friends nonethe-
less.245 The accused wished to rekindle the relationship and flew
in to visit with Mazeros and her children.2 46 The accused was al-
238. Id. at 1022.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1024.
241. [1974] S.C.R. 449 (Can.).
242. Id. at 451.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 455.
245. Id. at 456.
246. Id. at 455-56.
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legedly provoked by the deceased's statement, "I am not going to
marry you because you are a black man."247 It was held by the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal248 (and affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Canada) that the cultural and religious background of
the accused was not relevant to the determination of the objective
test.249
Madame Justice Wilson critiqued this holding in her dissent in
Hill.25 ° She stated that the court in Parnerkar assumed that in-
sults occur in a vacuum and that, therefore, no facts pertinent to
the individual accused need be taken into account in assessing
the reaction to an insult.251 This assumption, however, does not
conform to reality since an insulting remark or gesture must be
placed in context before the extent of its provocation can be real-
istically assessed.252 Thus, Madame Justice Wilson advocated for
an examination of certain characteristics of the accused in order
to properly contextualize the wrongful act or insult. 3
I agree with Justice Wilson that the insult must be contextual-
ized to provide a realistic assessment of its provocative capability.
I would take her approach even farther, however, and argue that
the characteristics of the victim (white woman), the nature of the
insult (racist), and the interplay of racism and sexism in society
should also have been considered by the Court.
In the ideal situation an investigation would be made of certain
variables. For instance, is it racist to call an East Indian man a
black man? Is it racist for an East Indian man to be enraged at
being referred to as a black man? Was the accused regularly sub-
jected to racist insults? Was the accused's response to the victim
not wanting to marry him-whatever the reason--sexist? What
was the nature of the relationship between the accused and the
victim?
Such a holistic approach presents a clearer picture of what ac-
tually happened and the level of mitigation, if any, which may be
appropriate. One could also question whether there had been
247. Id. at 457.
248. Parnerkar v. The Queen, [1972] 5 C.C.C.2d 11, 27-28 (Sask. C.A.).
249. Parnerkar, [1974] S.C.R. at 455.
250. R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313, 345-48 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 345.
252. Id. at 345-46.
253. Id. at 346.
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previous incidences of domestic violence. It is doubtful whether
the totality of this fully contextual exercise can easily fit within
the confines of the present provocation defence. As such, I would
ultimately advocate for a more complete contextual reconstruc-
tion of the defence. However, there is clearly some room within
the confines of the current defence for consideration of basic con-
textual questions.
In recognition of our diverse society, I am cautious of advocat-
ing for an approach to the defence of provocation which could lead
to the construction of a hierarchy of equality-seeking groups.
What I would advocate against, therefore, is the creation of a
ranking system of discrimination whereby membership in one
marginalized group is used to trump membership in another.
This is to be avoided. The defence requires a nuanced apprecia-
tion of the intricacies of a diverse society. The Parnerkar case il-
lustrates the challenges posed and the necessity of utilizing a
fully intersectional, multi-dimensional, and contextual analysis.
This is clearly a complicated issue requiring appropriate focus
and consideration of a multiplicity of perspectives.
4. "On The Sudden Before There Was Time For His Passions To
Cool"
2 4
If the objective test is satisfied, a subjective test is used to de-
termine whether the accused was provoked "suddenly" and, fur-
ther, whether the accused actually acted upon the provocation. 5
The subjective test for provocation involves a determination of
what actually occurred in the mind of the accused at the time of
the alleged provocation. 6 While the character, background, tem-
perament, idiosyncrasies or drunkenness of the accused are not to
be considered in the objective test, they can be considered in the
subjective test.257 Expert evidence may also be adduced to show
that because of his/her emotional make-up, the accused was more
likely to respond to the provocation. 5 8
With respect to the first issue, the impact of the wrongful act or
254. Criminal Code § 232(2).
255. See id.
256. See R. v. Tripodi, [1955] S.C.R. 438 (Can.).
257. See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 211, at 3-4.
258. See id.
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insult, the accused cannot have been prepared for the provoca-
tion. It has been held that, "[t]he wrongful act or insult must
strike upon a mind unprepared for it, that it must make an unex-
pected impact that takes the understanding by surprise and sets
the passions aflame."
259
Again playing devil's advocate, I raise a potential issue with
this point. Specifically, the consequences of a wrongful act or in-
sult to a "conscious" racialized person versus a person who dis-
covers his or her racialization late in life may be entirely differ-
ent. A person who might have been oblivious to the realities of
racism only to be suddenly jarred to the stark realties of dis-
crimination might, in fact, have a more violent reaction than a
more "conscious" racialized person who is more savvy in her nego-
tiation of racial matters.260 While one may not be able to predict
with certainty the disparities in reactions, one should contem-
plate the role of "consciousness" as either a further exacerbating
or vitiating circumstance impacting the availability of the de-
fence.
On its face, this requirement presents a potential hurdle for
marginalized persons.26' For instance, many marginalized com-
munities, and persons of color in particular, have come to expect
some degree of racism on a frequent basis.262 The reality is, how-
ever, that the sting of racial abuse can never be underesti-
mated-it is always painful and upsetting, no matter how many
times one is abused or mistreated because of his or her race. Fur-
ther, women have been socialized to expect some level of sexual
harassment-does this mean women cannot be provoked by such
abuse? These considerations reveal the strength of patriarchy,
heterosexism, and racism, and the fact that the suddenness re-
quirement of the provocation defence may disparately impact
women and minorities.263
259. Tripodi, [1955] S.C.R. at 443.
260. See generally PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN
AMERICA (1999); Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Black Bay Street Lawyers and Other Oxy-
mora, 20 CAN. J. BUS. L. 267,269 (1998).
261. See St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 12.
262. See Davis, supra note 171, at 1560.
263. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 101, at 460.
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There is, however, helpful jurisprudence in this regard. In a
case involving an abusive friendship,26 the Supreme Court of
Canada recognized that just because the accused had routinely
suffered hurt and insults from the victim over a considerable pe-
riod of time, he was not made immune from the victim's abuse
and insults that allegedly led to the killing.265 The Court recog-
nized that "anyone may have a breaking point."266
The crucial issue with respect to the suddenness requirement
is whether the accused was in fact reacting on the sudden.267
There must be a causal connection between the provocation and
the killing: the accused must have killed because he was pro-
voked, not merely because provocation existed.268 In some circum-
stances it is possible that, where an ordinary person would have
been provoked, the accused was not. This could occur where the
accused was more resistant to the provocation than an ordinary
person would be. This might be the response to the "conscious
black" person hypothetical posed earlier. There may also be spe-
cific evidence indicating that the accused was not, in fact, pro-
voked or reacted in a measured way and therefore not out of pas-
sion.
As to the temporal connection between the provocation and the
accused's reaction, it is a matter of common sense that the longer
the gap in time, the more likely a jury will come to the conclusion
that the retaliation was calculated, rather than the result of pas-
sion. This reality of the suddenness requirement poses several
acute problems for women and members of racialized communi-
ties.
While it is implicit, given the history of the defence, that
women can provoke men by way of "insult" into committing mur-
der, the courts have rarely accepted that battered women can be
264. Linney v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 646 (Can.). The accused and the deceased
had been friends but on the day of the killing the deceased had entered the accused's
house uninvited and drunk. Id. at 647. The deceased had physically assaulted the accused
who initially retreated to his bedroom but later shot the still abusive deceased. Id. at 648.
There was evidence that the deceased had acted in this manner towards the accused over
a long period of time. Id.
265. Id. at 653.
266. Id.
267. See GRANT, supra note 37, at § 6.2(d).
268. See R. v. Tripodi, [1955] S.C.R. 438, 443 (Can.).
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provoked into killing their male partners.269 Traditionally, very
few women have successfully used the defence of provocation.
Impediments to women's access include the requirement of sud-
denness and loss of control, as women are less likely to kill "on
the sudden" or in the "heat of passion."270 It has been noted:
where women do kill their husbands, it is invariably because of a
history of battering and abuse. Battered women tend not to react
with instant violence to taunts or violence, as men tend to do. For
one thing, they learn that this is likely to lead to worse beating. In-
stead, they typically respond by suffering a "slow-burn" of fear, de-
spair and anger that may erupt in the killing of their batterer.
271
Interestingly, in Australia and England the law on provocation
with respect to battered women has been reformed in order to
make its use by women offenders easier.7 In Australia, the "on
the sudden" requirement has been shifted to a broader period of
time as there can be a "cooling off' period.2 3 The offender need
269. The incidence of violence against women is commonplace. OTTAWA MINISTER OF
SUPPLY AND SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF THE CANADIAN PANEL ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN (1993). The Panel documented the pervasiveness of violence against women and
the failure of the justice system to adequately respond to this pressing issue. Between
1974 and 1990, women killed by their intimate partners accounted for at least sixty-one
percent of all adult female victims of homicide. On the other hand, men killed by their fe-
male partners accounted for approximately eight percent of all adult male victims of homi-
cide. A large percentage of these men would have subjected their female partners to physi-
cal and/or mental abuse. Additionally, it was found that although the number of wives
killing their husbands is decreasing considerably, the murder of husbands killing their
wives remains stable. See also MARIA CRAWFORD & ROSEMARY GARTNER, WOMAN
KILLING: INTIMATE FEMICIDE IN ONTARIO, 1974-1990, 43-44 (1992); St. Lewis & Galloway,
supra note 43, at 4 (collating the statistics).
270. St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 22.
271. Id. at 22-23.
272. See N.S.W. CRIMES ACT § 23.
273. The Australian provocation statute is as follows:
23. (1) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that the act or
omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation and,
but for this subsection and the provocation the jury would have found the ac-
cused guilty of murder, the jury shall acquit the accused of murder and find
the accused guilty of manslaughter.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an act or omission causing death is an
act done or omitted under provocation where:
(a) the act or omission is the result of a loss of self-control on the part of the
accused that was induced by any conduct of the deceased (including grossly
insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the accused, and
(b) that conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary
person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to have
formed an intent to kill, or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon, the deceased,
whether that conduct of the deceased occurred immediately before the act or
10592002]
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not have acted in the heat of passion. Additionally, the entire re-
lationship between the offender and the deceased is examined. 4
The objective test is satisfied by proof that the ordinary person
could have viewed and responded to the provocation as the ac-
cused did.275 A similar proposal has also been put forward as an
option by the Department of Justice in Canada. 6
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE PROVOCATION DEFENCE-FEMICIDE,
HOMOPHOBIA, CULTURAL ESSENTIALISM
Much of the controversy surrounding the provocation defence
relates to the purpose and systemic effects of its application.
These concerns relate both to the theory behind the defence, as
well as its practical application.
omission causing death or at any previous time.
(3) For the purpose of determining whether an act or omission causing death
was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided by subsection (2),
there is no rule of law that provocation is negatived if-
(a) there was not a reasonable proportion between the act or omission caus-
ing death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the act or omission,
(b) the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted sud-
denly, or
(c) the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted with any in-
tent to take life or inflict grievous bodily harm.
(4) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, there is any evidence that the
act causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided
by subsection (2), the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted
under provocation.
(5) This section does not exclude or limit any defence to a charge of murder.
Id.
274. See id.
275. Such cumulative effects have already been recognized in Australian law which
permits a time interval between the final provoking event and the killing; the New South
Wales Crimes Act of 1990 incorporated an amended provocation provision that was sensi-
tive to domestic violence, saying that provocative conduct is relevant whether it "occurred
immediately before the act or omission causing death or at any previous time." Id. §
23(2)(b). Cumulative provocation has also been recognized in practice by some United
Kingdom courts that will, in a case of long standing provocation, take the slightest 'new'
act on the part of the victim as "allowing the entire train of events to be included." See
Baker, supra note 188, at 196. There is already therefore, some movement in other juris-
dictions to extend the scope of provocation to accommodate the experience of domestic
abuse, and there is some precedent in our recent law of self-defence for such an extension.
See id. at 195.
276. See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 211, at 11-19.
277. Id. at 7.
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While the theory behind the defence is the recognition of hu-
man frailty, some would argue that provocation is applied to ex-
cuse violence in a manner which is outdated by modern societal
values. Indeed, the fact that the defence is available to excuse
outbursts of violence in response to non-violent as well as violent
acts is seen by some as a fundamental shortcoming of the de-
fence.279
The defence is particularly disconcerting for some feminists
and gay rights advocates.280 The critical issue is whether the law
of provocation reflects antiquated societal values which condone
violence against already marginalized communities.
A. Femicide and Unavailability of the Defence to Women
The provocation defence, as applied, reinforces patriarchal ide-
als.281 Many critics claim that the assumptions underlying the de-
fence are based on an outmoded model of male behavior.2 2 Com-
mentators have indicated that archaic notions of women as the
property of their present or former male partners still surface in
provocation cases.2 For instance, the provocation defence has
278. See id.
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 188; Adrian Howe, Green v. The Queen: The Provoca-
tion Defence: Finally Provoking Its Own Demise?, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 466 (1997).
281. When I deploy the term "patriarchy," I mean a system that orders not only gender
and sex, but also sexuality. Not only does patriarchy privilege males in society, but hetero-
sexuals are privileged as well. See Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Trac-
ing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. &
HUM2AN. 161 (1996).
282. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 211, at 7-8. See GRANT, supra note 37; CUt6,
supra note 43, at 61; J. Greene, A Provocation Defence for Battered Women Who Kill, 123
ADEL. L. REV. 145, 146 (1989) (asking to "what degree is the proposition [that a provoked
killing is less blameworthy than a cold-blooded killing] grounded in the law's understand-
ing of and acceptance of male behavior patterns?"); Howe, supra note 280; Jenny Morgan,
Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told About Them, 21
MELB. U.L. REv. 237 (1997); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and
the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997); Melissa Spatz, A Lesser Crime: A
Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill Their Wives, 24 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 597 (1991); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason In Men and Women:
Heat-Of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679 (1986).
283. GRANT, supra note 37; CUt6, supra note 43, at 61; St. Lewis & Galloway, supra
note 43, at 3; see also Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but
Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense
and Provocation Cases, 26 AA1. J. CRI. L. 1 (1998); Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder
and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era,
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been used to justify or excuse male violence towards women who
have attempted to assert some form of control over their own
lives. 4 In this way, men have successfully argued that their
wife's or girlfriend's obtaining employment, leaving the home, be-
ing with friends, or seeing other men or women was provoca-
tive.285
The crux of much of the feminist critique of the provocation de-
fence stems from a view of provocation as excusing homicidal rage
generally and homicidal rage towards women specifically.286 Be-
cause there is no defence if the motivating emotion for homicide is
compassion or pity, as in the case of euthanasia, the existence of
the defence is even more questionable.287 The following argument
from a feminist criminal law textbook is persuasive:
The idea that a killing is partially justified seems to flow into the
idea that the deceased in some sense deserved to die. Even if provo-
cation were argued in very different cases, for instance with respect
to the killing of smokers, sexual harassers, or pornographers, there
is something offensive about the implication of just desserts. The of-
fensiveness becomes even more acute where it is a defence used by
men to justify, albeit partially, the killing of women as a form of con-
trol.
28 8
The problematic origins of the defence belie its troubled his-
tory. By the early nineteenth century, provocation would reduce
murder, still a capital offence, to manslaughter, a non-capital of-
fence, in three situations:
1) "Chance Medley" (a sudden falling out or spontaneous fight
between men, including coming to the assistance of a kinsman);
2) a husband discovering his wife in the act of adultery; and
3) a father discovering someone in the act of sodomizing his
son.
289
49 SMU L. REV. 1507 (1996); Deborah E. Milgate, Note, The Flame Flickers, But Burns
On: Modern Judicial Application of the Ancient Heat of Passion Defense, 51 RUTGERS L.
REV. 193 (1998).
284. See GRANT, supra note 37, § 6.2; C6t6, supra note 43, at 61; St. Lewis & Galloway,
supra note 43, at 3.
285. See GRANT, supra note 37, § 6.2.
286. See St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 3-4.
287. See GRANT, supra note 37, § 6.2, at 6-3; see also Rodriguez v. British Columbia,
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.).
288. GRANT, supra note 37, § 6.2, at 6-9.
289. For a detailed analysis of the developmental history of the defence of provocation,
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Arguably these foundations of the defence would similarly
benefit women accused of murder. However, as history has not
borne this proposition out, there is scholarship criticizing these
sources of the provocation defence.290 Additionally, there is con-
cern that battered women have not benefited from the provoca-
tion defence when they murder their abusers.29' Much of this in-
equity stems from the requirement that the accused have acted
before his or her passions cool.292 Women in battering situations
typically do not kill their abusers in the "heat of passion" as tradi-
tionally contemplated by the defence. 29" Rather there is an
accumulation of fear, which properly implicates a re-examination
of situations.2 94 Additionally, women of color, especially black
women in the United States and First Nations women in Canada,
have had greater difficulty in convincing the courts to admit ex-
pert testimony on battered woman's syndrome in their cases.29
Even though the provocation defence is only a partial excuse,
unlike self-defence, it is all the more important for women who
have difficulty benefiting from the battered woman's syndrome.29
As such, the defence may also be useful to battered women who
kill after ongoing provocation by their batterer.
In Canada, other than self-defence, there is no criminal law de-
fence or plea that has been effective as a (partial) excuse or justi-
fication for killings by abused women.2" This has led some com-
see JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 24 (1992). See also TONI PICKARD
ET AL., DBIENSIONS OF CRmINAL LAw 804, 805 (2d ed. 1996) (They ask "[wihat can be
made of the fact that originally the only exception accommodated by the law was murder-
ous patriarchal rage?").
290. See GRANT, supra note 37, § 6.2; St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 1-4; see
also Joshua Dressier, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on
Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and The "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995); James J. Sing, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of
Provocation and Culture in the Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845 (1999); Milgate, supra
note 283.
29L See PICKARD, supra note 289.
292. See St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 22.
293. See id.
294. See id. at 22-23.
295. See Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Femi-
nist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1991); Angela Mae Kupenda, Law, Life, and
Literature: A Critical Reflection of Life and Literature to Illuminate How Laws of Domestic
Violence, Race, and Class Bind Black Women, 42 HOW. L.J. 1 (1998); Laura E. Reece,
Women's Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel:
The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 53 (1991).
296. Baker, supra note 188, at 199.
297. Cf GRANT, supra note 37, § 6.2, at 6-3 (noting that defences such as necessity and
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mentators to reject the defence as unhelpful to women.298 Given
its relative ineffectiveness in mitigating the situation confronting
both the battered woman who responds with violence and the
woman who reacts violently to her partner's adultery, these calls
for abolition are persuasive. It is not, however, the case that the
defence (even as currently structured) is incapable of benefiting
women. Rather it is the misapplication of the defence and igno-
rance of the plight of women that has effectively stymied an equi-
table and informed application of the defence.
The reality of an essentially homogenous judiciary dealing with
the plight of marginalized communities, whether victims or ac-
cused, is clear.2 99 The legal system has failed to recognize and cri-
tique the fundamentally elitist, heterosexist, sexist, and racist
aspects of its value system. "This is not an indictment of the legal
system per se: it is inevitable that the legal system can only re-
flect the culture in which it sits.""0
Since homicides by women make up a small fraction of all homicides,
even a reformed defence of provocation would be rarely used. But the
more important question is whether a plea which has been available
to men for several centuries should not also be (much more) available
to women who kill, and whether closer attention to the situations and
perspectives of women in abusive relationships yields good grounds
for thinking some kill as excusable or reasonable responses to serious
provocation. The underlying concern is an equality concern; that
women have equal access to suitable defences for their putative
breaches of the criminal law, and that standards of reasonableness
operative in criminal case deliberation be as responsive to women's
experience and women's values as they are to men's.
30 1
duress cannot reduce a charge of murder).
298. See St. Louis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 22.
299. See Richard Devlin et al., Reducing the Democratic Deficit: Representation, Diver-
sity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a "Triple P" Judiciary, 38 ALBERTA L. REV.
734, 736 (2000) (stating that "Canada is a heterogeneous democratic society characterized
by widespread diversity and pluralism. However, one of the most powerful institutions in
Canadian society, the judiciary, is relatively homogeneous. In this article, we submit that
this apparent contradiction is indefensible."). Part III of the article, which features an em-
pirical study, surveys the current appointment processes and the demographic profile of
the Canadian judiciary-federally, provincially, and territorially. Id. at 758. The numbers
show that only modest improvements have been made in changing the composition of the
Canadian bench. Id. at 762-63. While there has been some progress in the representation
of women, other historically marginalized groups remain significantly under-represented.
Id. at 763. See also Final Report and Recommendations of the Eighth Circuit Gender Fair-
ness Task Force, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 9 (1997); Ifill, supra note 123; Ifill, Racial Diver-
sity on the Bench: Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000).
300. St. Lewis & Galloway, supra note 43, at 7.
301. Baker, supra note 188, at 193-94 (emphasis added).
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B. Validation of Homophobic Rage and Gay Panic
Courts have regularly accepted the provocation defence in cir-
cumstances where the accused claimed to have been offended by
an unwanted homosexual advance." 2 Indeed, Hill, the leading
Canadian provocation case, involved such an alleged advance.3°3
As the law now stands "gay panic," as a response to a nonvio-
lent homosexual advance, may constitute sufficient provocation to
incite the reasonable man to lose his self-control and kill in the
heat of passion, thus mitigating murder to manslaughter.30 4 This
renders visible the problematic judicial construction of the rea-
sonable homophobic man. Critics of this result argue that provo-
cation, as a homosexual-advance defence or gay panic defence, is
a misguided application of provocation theory and a judicial insti-
tutionalization of homophobia. 3 5 I agree. 'The homosexual-
advance appeals to irrational fears, revulsion, and hatred preva-
lent in heterocentric society, focusing blame on the victim's real
or imagined sexuality."3 6 Hopefully, an evaluation of this con-
struction of the reasonable man through the lens of Charter val-
ues would operate to curtail inequitable application of the de-
fence. This should be the case given judicial recognition of sexual
orientation as an analogous ground of prohibited discrimina-
tion.30
7
In allowing the defence to operate as an oppressive tool against
already marginalized communities, the judiciary reinforces and
302. R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.); Dir. Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, [1978]
A.C. 705 (H.L.); R. v. Hansford, [1987] 33 C.C.C.3d 74 (Alta. C.A.); see also GRANT, supra
note 37, § 6.2(b), at 6-13 n.53.
303. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 320.
304. See Hill, [1986] S.C.R. at 335; People v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998). The Chicago Tribune noted the use of this defence in the Schmitz case. See Risky
'Gay Panic" Defense Emerges at Murder Trial, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1999, at 10 (stating
that Jonathan Schmitz's case was "a perfect example" of using the homosexual panic de-
fence to mitigate a murder conviction); see also Robert G. Bagnall et al., Burdens on Gay
Litigants and Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anony-
mous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497, 497-515 (1984) (detailing case law involv-
ing the gay panic defence); Gary David Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic De-
fense, 2 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 81, 81 (1992); Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in
Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133
(1992).
305. See Mison, supra note 304, at 133.
306. Id.
307. See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.).
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institutionalizes violent prejudices at the expense of norms of
self-control, tolerance, and compassion that ought to be encour-
aged in society. The defence has been used to affirm homophobia.
This undermines the ability of courts to produce fair verdicts be-
cause it creates a lower standard of protection against violence for
a marginalized class of victims. 30 8
Some commentators have concluded that we ought to expect
more from our courts-that judges should hold as a matter of law
that a homosexual advance is not sufficient provocation to incite a
reasonable man to kill.30 9 Murderous homophobia should be con-
sidered an irrational and idiosyncratic characteristic of the killer
in such a way as to deny the application of the defence, as the or-
dinary person standard rejects such peculiarities.31 °
The judiciary's acceptance of this defence in circumstances
where a woman or gay man would seldom receive similar benefits
is problematic and is perhaps an unfortunate result of the origins
of the defence. For instance:
(1) it is highly unlikely that a heterosexual woman would ever
have recourse to the defence when confronted with an un-
wanted heterosexual advance;
(2) similarly it is doubtful that a lesbian would have access to
the defence in the case of an unwanted sexual advance from
another woman or from a man; and
(3) it is unlikely that a gay man would have recourse to the de-
fence when confronted with an unwanted homosexual advance
or an unwanted heterosexual advance.
C. Cultural Essentialism/Cultural Paternalism
I have additional concerns with the application of the defence
308. See Mison, supra note 304, at 136.
309. Id. at 135.
310. See Dressier, supra note 290; Howe, supra note 280; Mison, supra note 304.
Homophobic rage should be viewed as normatively objectionable, despite the fact that
prejudice against lesbians and gays may not be "idiosyncratic" or "peculiar" in our society.
The question, then, is not whether it is unusual to kill based upon such beliefs; all pro-
voked killings should be viewed as unusual. The question should be whether the equality-
seeking mandate of the Charter should be used to prevent a rage or panic defence based
upon prescribed grounds, despite the fact that homophobic-based rage may not, statisti-
cally, be more unusual than other provoking experiences.
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in such a way as to foster what may translate into cultural pater-
nalism and essentialism.3 ' Examples include instances where the
defence is advanced to show that an accused, from a particular
cultural background, is more easily provoked by adultery, for ex-
ample, because it causes him to lose face in his community. Simi-
larly, it has been articulated that when applying the provisions of
the defence, persons from certain "ethnic" backgrounds cannot be
expected to have the same measured temperament as cool and
collected "Westerners." 12
One scholar concludes that there are several reasons why eth-
nicity has a strong claim to being recognized alongside age, as a
qualification to the power of self-control aspect of the ordinary
person test.3 13 He claims that the same justifications for making
age a qualification are equally supportive of ethnicity.3 14 It could
be argued that the law should account for the comparative lack of
exposure on the part of the immigrant to the various socializing
institutions of the host country, such as family and school, when
compared to one who has been raised in the host country since
childhood. 15
311. Essentialism has been defined as "the set of fundamental attributes which are
necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be [considered] a thing of that type." Jane
Wong, The Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Debate in Feminist Legal Theory: The Debate
and Beyond, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 274 (1999) (quoting M.A. Ntumy, Essen-
tialism and the Search for the Essence of Law, 18 MELANESIAN L.J. 64, 64 (1990)).
To define a thing is to express its essence in words. Thus, definition involves
two steps: first, distinguishing the object from other objects by referring to
certain parts of its characterization in order to capture its intuitive essence,
and second, characterizing the object within a single concept so as to permit
the definition to move to a discursive understanding. The result is that the
characteristics used to define a thing are thought to inhere in its very essence
and, thus, to be unchangeable.
Id. at 274-75 (alteration in original). The precise meaning of essentialism in feminist legal
theory and critical race theory may not be a fixity. Id. at 275. Essentialism assumes that
all women or racialized people share the same inherent characteristics which are gener-
ated either biologically or socially. Id. Naturally, anti-essentialists oppose such assump-
tions. Id.
312. I acknowledge that the term "ethnic" is not mutually exclusive of the term "West-
erner." Indeed, part of the challenge of overcoming bigotry is to recognize the ethnicity and
racialization of all people. The colloquial usage of these terms cloaks the cultures of the
majority and transfers ethnicity as otherness. STANLEY YEO, UNDERSTANDING KILLINGS
AND THE LAW: PROVOCATION'AND EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENCE IN INDIA, ENGLAND AND
AUSTRALIA 80 (1998).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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Such assimilationist sentiment is unfortunate as the clear ex-
pectation is that, with time and development, the immigrant will
acquire a greater acceptance and appreciation of western ways.316
Thus, cultural acclimation will be the eventual result, and immi-
grants will come to govern themselves according to the "more
adult" cultural dictates of Westerners. 317 It is submitted that cul-
tural paternalism is manifest in this theory.
The ethnic derivation of the accused might also be relevant in an-
other respect, namely, the power of self-control to be expected of an
ordinary person of the same ethnic origin as the accused. Hence, in
the face of the same type of provocative conduct, a Latin, such as an
Italian who are by popular tradition impulsive by nature might more
readily lose his self-control than, say, the theoretically phlegmatic
Anglo-Saxon. 
318
Unlike the excuse/justification basis for the provocation de-
fence, which is applicable only after the elements of murder are
satisfied, the "cultural defence" is a legal strategy that is used by
defendants, who are often recent immigrants, in order to excuse
criminal behavior or to mitigate culpability based on a lack of the
requisite mens rea.319 Unlike this "cultural defence," the provoca-
tion defence is only applicable once the requisite elements of
murder are established-thus provocation does not relate specifi-
cally to either the mens rea or the actus reus of murder. The un-
derlying theory for the cultural defence is that the defendant
acted according to the dictates of his or her culture and, therefore,
leniency in the investigation of the mental element is necessary
in our multicultural society. Such cultural determinism is prob-
lematic. Not only is this assessment frequently based on stereo-
types, but the role of culture is largely viewed as a non-dynamic,
static fixity.321 While there is no formal "cultural defence," cul-
316. See id.
317. See Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, Ethnicity and the Objective Test in Provocation, 16
MELB. U. L. REV. 67, 70-71 (1987).
318. Id. at 70. See also Stanley Yeo, Proportionality in Criminal Defences, 12 CRIM.
L.J. 211 (1988).
319. See Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against
Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311,
1312 (1991); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural De-
fense," 17 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 57-58 (1994); Daina C. Chiu, Comment, The Cultural
Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053,
1053-54 (1994).
320. See Volpp, supra note 319, at 57.
321. See id. at 63.
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tural factors have been considered in assessing the mental state
of the accused or the culpability of the defendant.322 As one
scholar has noted:
The "cultural defense" presents several complex problems inher-
ent in essentializing a culture and its effect on a particular person's
behavior... I argue that any testimony about a defendant's cultural
background must embody an accurate and personal portrayal of cul-
tural factors used to explain an individual's state of mind and should
not be used to fit an individual's behavior into perceptions about
group behavior.
Presentation of cultural factors must also be informed by a rec-
ognition of the multiple, intersectional layers of group-based oppres-
sion that may be relevant to understanding any particular case.
In R. v. Ly,324 the defence argued for a culturally sensitive ap-
plication of the provocation defence.3 25 Defendant Ly, who was
born and raised in Vietnam, strangled his common law wife after
coming to believe that she had been unfaithful to him.326 In argu-
ing that he was provoked, the defence claimed that Ly had lost
face in his community, as it was a great dishonor for one's wife to
commit adultery.327 As such, defence counsel argued that the
standard to which Ly should be held was that of the ordinary
Vietnamese man.328 Regarding the objective test, the court held
that the jury was properly instructed to disregard the accused's
cultural background and information about the alleged attitude of
Vietnamese men towards suspected infidelity. 29 It was further
held that the fact that Ly was Vietnamese would be relevant only
if a racial slur had been involved.3
0
Accordingly, great care must be taken to ensure that the cur-
rent dynamics of the cultural defence debate do not perpetuate
dominant or stereotypical cultural values such as sexism and the
subordination of women in the name of racial and ethnic solidar-
322. See id.
323. Id. at 58.
324. [19871 33 C.C.C.3d 31 (B.C.CA.).
325. Id. at 31.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 37.
329. Id. at 39.
330. Id. at 38.
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ity.33 ' Because the definition of culture is not value-neutral, it is
necessary to ensure that the perspectives of women have an in-
fluence in the analysis of the culture at issue, and that evidence
of culture is solicited from a multiplicity of sources.332 Specifically,
in the Canadian setting, theorizing about the implications of
adultery for a given cultural group should not be made without
testimony from women's groups from within the relevant commu-
nity, or other directly affected and inherently knowledgeable ex-
perts from the equality-seeking communities at issue. I specify
inherent knowledge in distinction from removed and distantly ac-
quired book knowledge. Of course, an inherent expert may and
should have some book knowledge, but my distinction is an at-
tempt to prevent what I see as anthropological predation, to the
exclusion of the recognition of in-group expertise. For too long ex-
perts have been given the role of anthropological over-
seer-remaining aloof from, yet exerting control over cultures by
enunciating "expertise." Accordingly, I believe such extra-group
articulation of expertise should give way to enlightened deference
to those from within the community or culture at issue when such
expertise is clearly existent and forthcoming.
D. The Abuse Excuse by Alan Dershowitz333
When Professor Dershowitz penned The Abuse Excuse, he de-
voted three pages to what he referred to as the "black rage de-
fense." 34 Professor Dershowitz begins the chapter by stating, "[iut
was only a matter of time before the abuse excuse was taken to
its illogical conclusion and extended to cover an entire race of
'abused' people."335
Written in 1994, prior to the date that Professor Dershowitz
joined the O.J. Simpson "dream team," the chapter addresses the
Colin Ferguson case. 36 Professor Dershowitz ironically describes
331. See Chiu, supra note 319, at 1057.
332. See Volpp, supra note 319, at 58-59.
333. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994).
334. Id. at 89-91.
335. Id. at 89.
336. Id. at 89-91.
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the tactics used by Mr. Kunstler, one of the attorneys in the case,
as "play[ing] the race card."337
It is unlikely that this racial gambit will succeed, regardless of
the composition of the jurors, since the "black rage" variation on the
abuse-excuse defense is an insult to millions of law-abiding black
Americans. The vast majority of African Americans who never break
the law have not used the mistreatment they have suffered as an ex-
cuse to mistreat others. Crime is not a function of group characteris-
tics: It is an individual phenomenon that must be treated on an indi-
vidual basis.
Indeed, it is the essence of racism to make the kind of group
"rage" and group "abuse" arguments that Kunstler is now raising. It
will reaffirm racist fears among too many Americans that violent
crime is a "black problem." If black rage produces violent crime, or
even if it is a "catalyst" for it, then racists will be quick to justify
their fear of blacks as a group.
33 8
While I agree with Professor Dershowitz that crime is not a
function of group characteristics, it is an easy and convenient
strategy to insist that such logic is an insult to black Americans.
Of course most black Americans are law-abiding. What is needed,
however, is an appreciation of the role of the legacy of systemic
racism. This "context" may or may not be relevant to the individ-
ual case at hand.
As such, I agree with Professor Dershowitz's notion that the
analysis should not be framed at the group level.339 The collective
experience of racism might, however, be used in a principled way
to infuse an individual defence if there is a proper evidentiary
foundation upon which to introduce such experiences and place
the accused individual in context. Specifically, Professor Der-
showitz has not made any allowance for the realities of systemic
racism as directly relevant to an individual's experience. He cites
no sources, and alludes to no studies. Nonetheless, he confidently
declares that "[t]here is no evidence to support the notion that
groups that have been victimized by injustice turn to rage and
violence."34 Clearly this is wrong. Part of the error would seem to
stem from Professor Dershowitz's notions of the group. Are bat-
337. Id. at 90.
338. Id.
339. See id.
340. Id. at 91.
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tered women a group? Were "rebellious" slaves a group? In any
event, it is irrelevant whether groups turn to violence. Certainly,
individual members of groups may experience rage, which may or
may not manifest itself as violence. The analysis must focus on
the realities of the accused while appreciating the manner in
which societal and historic legacies of racism may infuse that re-
ality.
Accordingly, I agree with Professor Dershowitz that "[tihe
search for the particular causes of Colin Ferguson's rage must be-
gin by looking at him, at his own life experiences as a person, and
at his prior history."34' What Dershowitz fails to appreciate, how-
ever, is that if Ferguson's "life experiences" and "prior history"
reveal racial abuses of such magnitude as to be a catalyst for vio-
lence, this factor, while it may not be exculpatory, may be rele-
vant as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
Thus, as Professor Dershowitz states, "'[tlo understand is not to
forgive'; clearly "[a] history of racial victimization is not a license
to kill at random."342 However, as lawyers, we should recognize
that there are instances where the individual circumstances of
our clients may reveal an appropriate space for information re-
garding the impact of destructive societal forces. As such, while
not a license to kill, information regarding systemic oppressions
may prove insightful for numerous defences including, but not
limited to, provocation and insanity. Therefore, contrary to Der-
showitz's view that such information would be an abuse of legiti-
mate defences, 43 it is my sense that for some accuseds and for
certain marginalized communities, such an appreciation of reality
may prove to legitimate and genuinely ground the defences. In-
deed, it may be unethical to turn a blind eye to this reality of
one's client.
While bell hooks listened to her rage, she channeled it towards
writing her book Killing Rage in the heat of the moment.3" Of
course, this is the best way to use rage-nonviolently, towards
the ends of justice. However, not everyone has hook's ability to
channel that rage and turn it into something positive and elo-
quent. It is the less fortunate, perhaps more enraged persons, for
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See id.
344. BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 19 (1995).
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whom the provocation defence may provide recognition for rage
which heretofore had unfortunately found no other outlets. As
hooks observes, "[r]age can be consuming. It must be tempered by
engagement with a full range of emotional responses to black
struggle for self-determination."345 It is precisely this range of
emotional responses that may be lacking in those whose rage
leads to violent retaliation. In my opinion, it is precisely such rec-
ognition for human frailty which the defence of provocation was
intended to provide.
Many African-Americans feel uncontrollable rage when we en-
counter white supremacist aggression. That rage is not pathological.
It is an appropriate response to injustice. However, if not processed
constructively, it can lead to pathological behavior-but so can any
rage, irrespective of the cause that serves as a catalyst. In my own
case, the anger I felt about white supremacy that surfaced so in-
tensely as to be murderous shocked me. I had never felt such uncon-
trollable "killing rage." Had I killed the white man whose behavior
evoked that rage, I feel that it would not have been caused by "white
racism" but by the madness engendered by a pathological context.
Until this culture can acknowledge the pathology of white supremacy,
we will never create a cultural context wherein the madness of white
racist hatred of blacks or the uncontrollable rage that surfaces as a
response to that madness can be investigated, critically studied, and
understood.346
I appreciate that the suggested changes to the application of
the provocation defence may generate numerous sentiments, in-
cluding:
(1) resistance based upon fear, particularly on the part of
whites, that their own unwitting behavior may trigger violence
from some hapless racialized person;
(2) concerns that these suggestions constitute a license to kill;
(3) dreadful recollections of Colin Ferguson-the Long Island
gunman whose counsel threatened to use the so call "black
rage" defence;
(4) confusion as to why white racists should not similarly be
entitled to have evidence tendered of their racial context in or-
der to properly contextualize their actions; and
(5) reactions that homicide, under any circumstances, should
345. Id.
346. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
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not be excused or justified.
While I understand and respect many of the above concerns,
they support my advocacy for the need for continued education,
either through expert evidence, or plain-old everyday contact and
information, about the reality of racism for blacks and other per-
sons of color. There is an African proverb that states, "Until the
enemy comes to attack me in my camp, and I hear the fusillade
and I see them with my eyes, not until then shall I send out my
army in order of battle.""7 The fear of widespread racial violence
is likely of little real concern since many persons of color are
schooled to "pick our battles" wisely.
V. REFORMULATION OF THE DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION
Against the backdrop of Critical Race Theory, African-
American and Diaspora literature, civil rights speeches and arti-
cles there is evidence to suggest the legitimacy of what has come
to be known as "Black Rage"348 or what bell hooks refers to as
"Killing Rage." 9 Even a cursory review of this literature high-
lights the legitimacy of what I shall refer to as the phenomenon of
"cumulative provocation" and how this concept may well have a
place in our understanding of the defence of provocation. 350 Ra-
347. VOICES OF AFRICA: ITS WORDS AND PEOPLE 42 (1998).
348. The theory behind "Black Rage" is that in certain individuals, the right stimuli
will release an uncontrollable amount of rage. The stimuli or "rage button" is typically a
devaluation or racial insult. See generally GRIER & COBBS, supra note 219, at 210 (discuss-
ing the causes of"Black Rage.").
349. See HOOKS, supra note 344, at 26.
350. See THE AFRICAN DIASPORA (Joseph E. Harris et al. eds 1996); THE AFRICAN
DIASPORA: AFRICAN ORIGINS AND NEW WORLD IDENTITIES (Isidore Okpewho, et al. eds.
1999); THE AFRICAN DIASPORA: AFRICANS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS IN THE WIDER WORLD
1800 TO THE PRESENT (The Black Diaspora Comm. of How. Univ. ed. 1996); AGYEMANG
ATTAH-POKU, AFRICAN STABILITY AND INTEGRATION: REGIONAL, CONTINENTAL, AND
DIASPORIC PAN-AFRICAN REALITIES (2000); DERRICK BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshav et al. eds., 1995);
JACQUELINE DE WEEVER, MYTHMAKING AND METAPHOR IN BLACK WOMEN'S FICTION
(1992); THE EYES ON THE PRIZE: CIVIL RIGHTS READER (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1991);
MICHEL FABRE, FROM HARLEM TO PARIS: BLACK AMERICAN WRITERS IN FRANCE, 1840-
1980 (1991); DONALD B. GIBSON, THE POLITICS OF LITERARY EXPRESSION: A STUDY OF
MAJOR BLACK WRITERS (1981); NORMAN HARRIS, CONNECTING TIMES: THE SIXTIES IN
AFRo-AMERICAN FICTION (1988); CHARLES JOHNSON, BEING AND RACE: BLACK WRITING
SINCE 1970 (1988); RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL,
CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992);
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cism may engender feelings of frustration and rage which may in
turn lead to criminal behavior.3
A. Cumulative Provocation
In her poignant article on militant resistance, bell hooks as-
serts "I am writing this essay sitting beside an anonymous white
male that I long to murder."352 Although shocking, this statement
may resonate for many African-Americans and black people gen-
erally. We automatically understand the racial assaults leading
to such a statement long before hooks details the exhausting se-
quence of racial harassment that compel her towards this posi-
tion.3
53
It was these sequences of racialized incidents involving black
women that intensified my rage against the white man sitting next
to me. I felt a "killing rage." I wanted to stab him softly, to shoot him
with the gun I wished I had in my purse. And as I watched his pain,
I would say to him tenderly "racism hurts.
354
Part of this project involves an examination of that hurt. In
psychiatric terms, research suggests that black individuals may
suffer from serious racism-related disorders.355 Whether this phe-
nomenon is a proper consideration for the criminal law requires
further exploration.
What hooks has described so vividly is cumulative provoca-
tion.356 The white man sitting beside her was the proverbial
"straw that broke the camel's back" in a day and a lifetime filled
with racial abuses. If bell hooks had killed that white man, it is
RONALD T. TAKATI, VIOLENCE IN THE BLACK IMAGINATION: ESSAYS AND DOCUMENTS (Her-
bert Hill ed. 1993); RAJAGOPALAN RADHAKRISHNAN, DIASPORIC MEDIATIONS: BETWEEN
HOME AND LOCATION (1996).
351. LAWRENCE N. HOUSTON, PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE
130 (1990). One pair of sociologists have even suggested that more subtle forms of racism
within our society are more pernicious because black individuals are lulled into believing
that the achievement of the American dream is at hand, although severe obstacles actu-
ally prevent its attainment. FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 223, at vii.
352. HOOKS, supra note 344, at 8.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 11.
355. Robert L. Bragg, Discussion: Cultural Aspects of Mental Health Care for Black
Americans, in CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 182 (Albert Gaw ed., 1982); Billy E. Jones &
Beverly A. Gray, Problems in Diagnosing Schizophrenia and Affective Disorders Among
Blacks, 37 HoSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 61, 62-63 (1986); Pinderhughes, supra note 218, at
108; Spurlock, supra note 216, at 168.
356. See HOOKS, supra note 344, at 11.
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highly unlikely that she would or should have been privy to the
defence of provocation for the following reasons:
(1) The law does not account for serial provocation at the hands
of different and numerous provocateurs;
(2) while the white man in hooks's scenario had irritated her
due to his refusal to appreciate his complicity in racism and
sexism, there was no wrongful act or insult that the law would
easily appreciate as a catalyst;
(3) while hooks would have been acting before there was time
for her passions to cool, the provocation she describes would
have resulted from a slow burning anger, rather than a sudden
loss of control;
(4) it has been held that the provocative act or insult must
strike a mind that is unprepared for it. Given the daily reality
of racial harassment, it is likely that this requirement may
pose difficulty as many persons of color have come to expect
some level of racial harassment.
Of course it is possible that such a hypothetical situation prop-
erly falls outside of the defence of provocation. However, my con-
cern is that such sentiments are certainly not uncommon in con-
temporary black culture. A magazine article of several years ago
nicely captures the sense of rage felt by many blacks.
A big-city police officer once shared with me his frustration at
waiting nineteen years to make detective. In those days before af-
firmative action, he had watched, one year after another, as less
qualified whites were promoted over him. Each year he had swal-
lowed his disappointment, twisted his face into a smile, and con-
gratulated his white friends as he hid his rage-so determined was
he to avoid being categorized as a race-obsessed troublemaker.
He had endured other affronts in silence, including a vicious
beating by a group of white cops while carrying out a plain-clothes
assignment. As an undercover officer working within a militant
black organization, he had been given a code word to whisper to a
fellow officer if the need arose. When he was being brutalized, he had
screamed out the word and discovered it to be worthless. His injuries
had required surgery and more than thirty stitches. When he was
asked by his superior to identify those who had beat him, he feigned
ignorance; it seems a fellow officer had preceded his commander and
bluntly passed along the message that it was safer to keep quiet.
Even though he made detective years ago, and even though, on
the side (and on his own time), he managed to become a successful
businessman and an exemplary member of the upwardly striving
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middle class, he says that the anger still simmers within him. He
worries that someday it will come pouring out, that some luckless
white person will tick him off and he will explode, with tragic
results.
3 57
The failure of the defence to address such "killing rage" may
produce systemic inequality in a criminal justice system that is
already overly harsh on racialized persons.358 Indeed, the failure
of the provocation defence to address such rage may be yet an-
other instance where we should ponder "whether black folks and
white folks can ever be subjects together if white people remain
unable to hear black rage, if it is the sound of that rage which
must always remain repressed, contained, trapped in the realm of
the unspeakable."359
What many whites may take for the absence of rage may, in
fact, be a skill honed to the point of precision-the ability to hide
that rage or to reserve it for life at home in one's community.360
Repression of such rage is likely not only unhealthy but destruc-
tive.36' Specifically, what has been described as "black on black"
violence may be linked to the myriad abuses and humiliations
blacks suffer daily when we interact with whites.362 To express
our rage in that context has traditionally been suicidal, so it has
generally been turned inward or towards our own communities. 63
Nor does class stifle such rage; in fact, Newsweek magazine ran
a cover story on The Hidden Rage of Successful Blacks as if this
were a new phenomenon and not just something they were ac-
knowledging.
3 1'
357. Ellis Cose, Rage of the Privileged, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 61 (emphasis
added).
358. See generally THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS (2000) (dis-
cussing disparity in criminal sentencing and proprosing ways to remedy the problem).
359. HOOKS, supra note 344, at 12.
360. Id. at 13.
361. See id. at 14.
362. Id.
363. Id. For more information on this point see JUDY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA
AND REASONABLE RACISM (1997); DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND
DESTROY: AFRICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996); KATHERYN K.
RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEARS, BLACK PROTECTIONISM,
POLICE HARASSMENT AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998).
364. White and Black Ties, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 52.
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In these times most folks associate black rage with the under-
class, with desperate and despairing black youth who in their hope-
lessness feel no need to silence unwanted passions. Those of us black
folks who have "made it" have for the most part become skilled at re-
pressing our rage... ."Everyday we are choking down that rage."3
65
With increased politicization and self-recovery, rage is not the
exclusive domain of the so-called underclass. Dr. Richard Dudley,
Jr., writes that "even 'highly educated,' 'middle-class,' or 'success-
ful' professional Blacks do not, and cannot escape the ravages of
racism."36 6 It is precisely because professional blacks have to work
in predominantly white institutions that they are required to
spend a considerable amount of time on the "Black/White inter-
face."367 Consequently, they are forced to cope not only with the
institutionalized forms of racism, but also with heavy exposure to
the more insidious, day-to-day, personal insults that are con-
sciously or unconsciously directed at them by white people. 36" As
hooks states, "white folks have colonized black Americans, and a
part of that colonizing process has been teaching us to repress our
rage, to never make them the targets of any anger we feel about
racism."
369
As hooks and some psychiatrists have pointed out, such rage
may not be a pathological response to ongoing racial harass-
ment. ° It may be a completely legitimate response to cumulative
provocation, and hooks, for one, "urge[s] the larger culture to see
black rage as something other than a sickness, to see it as a po-
tentially healthy, potentially healing response to oppression and
exploitation."371
B. Extreme Expressions of Rage
I want to acknowledge that some expressions of "killing rage"
are pathological and may be a manifestation of mental illness. If
365. HOOKS, supra note 344, at 12 (quoting ANN PETRY, THE STREET (1946)).
366. Richard Dudley, Jr., Blacks in Policy-Making Positions, in BLACK FAMILIES IN
CRISIS: THE MIDDLE CLASS 15 (Alice F. Coner-Edwards & Jeanne Spurlock eds., 1988).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. HOOKS, supra note 344, at 14.
370. Telephone Interview with Dr. Richard Dudley, Jr., Forensic Psychiatrist (Mar. 18,
1999); see HOOKS, supra note 344, at 12.
371. HOOKS, supra note 344, at 12.
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the retaliation is not measured, if there is no clear spark or cata-
lyst from the victim and the impetus of the incident seems to be
violence for violence's sake, the violence may not fit within the
confines of traditional criminal law defences, excepting insanity.
My understanding of the Reginald Denny assault leads me to the
conclusion that this incident was such a pathological attack.
Denny, a truckdriver, entered the intersection of Florence and
Normandie Avenues in South-Central Los Angeles.3 72 As one
newspaper described the incident:
As Denny's truck slowly entered the intersection, a young man
named Antoine Miller yanked open the door of the cab, allowing oth-
ers to pull Denny into the street. Another young man named Henry
Watson held Denny's head down with his foot. Someone else kicked
him in the belly. [Another] man... hurled a five-pound piece of
medical equipment from the looted truck at Denny's head and hit
him three times with a claw hammer. The most damaging blow was
administered by 19-year-old Damian Williams, who at point-blank
range hurled a... ("brick")... at Denny's head. It struck Denny on
the right temple and knocked him unconscious. Williams did a vic-
tory dance over the hapless man.
3 7 3
A final young man spit on Denny and walked away with Wil-
liams, leaving the trucker bleeding and unconscious in the
street.374 The beating of Mr. Denny was a delayed reaction to an-
other brutal beating, in March 1991, also caught on video-tape:
that of a black motorist, Rodney King, by four white police offi-
cers. 5 Although these actions are deplorable by any standard, it
is often forgotten that it was also black people who rushed in to
assist the injured trucker.
Damian Williams was charged with attempted murder in the
brutal and unprovoked assault on Denny.376 He was convicted in
state court on lesser charges.7 Williams argued that he had been
intoxicated by the riot. bell hooks concludes:
372. Lou Cannon, Worlds Collide at Florence and Normandie: As Four Police Officers
Go Free, an Intersection Ignites a Riot That Will Change Los Angeles, WASH. POST, Jan.
26, 1998, at A14.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Prosecutors to Seek 10-Year Term, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1993, at A18.
377. Id.
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[W]ithout a more sophisticated understanding of those particularly
extreme expressions of rage which indicate serious mental disorder,
we will not be able to address the complexity and multidimensional
nature of black rage. We will not be able to understand the psycho-
logical displacement of grief and pain into rage. And without that
understanding the deeper dimensions of black rage cannot be ac-
knowledged, nor the psychological wounds it masks attended to.
3 78
Clearly, a line has to be drawn between a justifiable or excus-
able reaction to cumulative provocation and systemic oppression
via the provocation defence and a pathological response to racism,
which implicates the insanity defence or an appropriate denial of
mitigation altogether. My initial thoughts are that such a line
will depend on several factors already recognized in the defence of
provocation:
(1) the existence of a wrongful act, insult or Charter violating
behavior;
(2) the timing of the violence, i.e., whether it occurred "out of
the blue" or in relation to a racial incident;
(3) the proportionality and responsiveness of the violence to
the catalyst-i.e., whether one blow was administered or
whether one shot was fired as opposed to a continuation of vio-
lence if the victim was no longer able to struggle, as in the
Denny case; and
(4) the implication of the psychological background of the ac-
cused, i.e., in cases where there is a history of mental disorder,
drug use, random violence, or other similar factors.
In the course of writing this paper another incident took place
which should also be assessed in light of the alleged racial con-
text. Ronald Taylor, a black man, went on a deadly shooting ram-
page near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, killing three and wounding
two others." 9 Taylor is charged with three counts of criminal
378. HOOKS, supra note 344, at 27.
379. Accused Killer of 3 Is Linked to Racist Writing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at A12
[hereinafter Accused Killer]; Investigators: Racist Writings Found in Home, PRESS. J.,
Mar. 6, 2000, at A14 [hereinafter Investigators]; Punish Hate Crimes, KAN. CITY STAR,
Mar. 6, 2000, at B4 [hereinafter Punish Hate]; Rampage Suspect's Papers Filled With
Hate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 4, 2000, at 9A [hereinafter Rampage Suspect]; Ser-
vices Aim at Healing After Shooting Rampage, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 6, 2000, at A4
[hereinafter Services Aim]; Todd Spangler, Hate Filled Gunman, Police Say; Officials in
Wilkinsburg Say They Found Racist Writings and 'Target' List in Suspect's Home,
MORNING CALL, Mar. 4, 2000, at A3; Writings of Suspect Are Filled with Hate, Police Say,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCY, Mar. 4, 2000, at A3 [hereinafter Writings of Suspect].
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homicide, aggravated assault, arson, and "ethnic intimidation,"
the Pennsylvania equivalent of a hate crime.8 0 All five of his vic-
tims were white, and police claim to have found messages of hate
in Taylor's apartment.3"' Taylor apparently became enraged over
work being done in his apartment and began screaming racial
epithets at repairmen.3 2 He shot and killed one of the workers,
set fire to the apartment, and proceeded to two fast-food restau-
rants, where he shot four others, killing two.
383
Ronald Taylor... has emerged, in interviews with neighbors,
witnesses and authorities, as a man filled with rage, but no criminal
record. Police said his anger apparently had been simmering for
some time. He had complained about one thing or another since at
least October, his landlord said. Police said an argument over a bro-
ken door triggered the 39-year-old black man to go on a shooting
spree that killed three people and wounded two. Investigators said
Taylor targeted white people Wednesday, at one point telling a black
woman, "Not you, sister," as he waved a gun and threatened a group
of women. Police said he told a black man that his gun was only for
"crackers."
384
While more facts need to be elicited to fully appreciate the con-
text of this tragedy, it is becoming apparent that Mr. Taylor was
motivated to some extent by what he saw as a racial context. The
preliminary facts of this incident resemble the facts in the
case of United States v. Robertson.8 5 After shooting the white vic-
tim, "Robertson raced down the middle of the street, brandishing
his pistol and cursing 'white sons-of-bitches."' 3 6 Seeing a police
officer, he shouted, "You are doing it; why can't I? Yes, I shot the
white honkey son-of-a-bitch. What are you all going to do about
it?"'387 At trial, it was revealed that Robertson continued to make
such statements even upon being taken into the police station.
380. Accused Killer, supra note 379; Services Aim, supra note 379.
381. See sources cited supra note 379.
382. Investigators, supra note 379; Jere Longman, Gunman Surrenders After Killing 2
in Restaurants in Pittsburgh Suburb, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 2, 2000 at A25; Spangler, supra
note 379; Writings of Suspect, supra note 379.
383. Accused Killer, supra note 379; Investigators, supra note 379; Longman, supra
note 381; Spangler, supra note 379; Writings of Suspect, supra note 379.
384. National Briefs, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 5,2000, at A3.
385. 507 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974), supp. opinion, 529 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per
curiam), appeal after remand, 430 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.O. 1977).
386. Id. at 1150.
387. Id.
388. Id.
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Robertson rejected the insanity defence partly due to his rejection
of the racial stereotype that "all angry Blacks are mentally ill." 9
Mr. Taylor, on the other hand, acknowledged a history of men-
tal illness at his arraignment. ° I query, however, the role of ra-
cism in contributing to and exacerbating this illness. "The under-
lying... assumption in the black-rage cases is that... racism
affects the mental functioning of individuals."391 It is clear, how-
ever, that such an investigation is not welcome by all and is seen
as an unwelcome and unnecessary investigation into the founda-
tions of criminal defences. 92
VI. CONCLUSION
A move toward contextualization in the doctrine of provocation
does not create an "open season" for a racialized person to kill in-
discriminately. To understand why the accused acted as he or she
did does not necessarily lead to complete forgiveness or exonera-
tion. Indeed, the defence of provocation operates only as a miti-
gating defence-a fact that cannot be overemphasized. The result
of taking into account the social reality of an accused is merely a
more realistic assessment of his or her criminal responsibility or
culpability.
Unlike the cultural defences which have at their essence a pre-
sumption of America or Canada as cultureless-operating from
the perspective that it is only the immigrants who have cul-
ture-the extrapolation proposed in this paper posits an exami-
nation of "majority" culture as discriminatory in a way which may
be provocative to racialized persons. 3
The criminal justice system must strive to acknowledge the
various roles of law generally, and the criminal justice system in
389. Falk, supra note 163, at 750 n.105.
390. Accused Killer, supra note 379.
391. Falk, supra note 163, at 773.
392. See Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young
Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 433 (1994); George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J.
1661 (1987); Kimberly M. Copp, Note, Black Rage: The Illegitimacy of a Criminal Defense,
29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205, 237 (1995); Judd F. Snierson, Comment, Black Rage and the
Criminal Law: A Principled Approach to a Polarized Debate, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2251
(1995).
393. See Volpp, supra note 319, at 66.
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particular. Socially engineering a society that promotes justice for
all, yet recognizes and seeks to alleviate discriminatory burdens
and disadvantages faced by other members of society, must be a
central focus of the criminal justice system. Additionally, law
must serve an educative role and perhaps even a collectively ca-
thartic role.
It is true that my suggestions would lengthen trials. This
would, however, be more than compensated for by the increase in
fair results and increased perceptions of fairness. Justice must
not only be done-it must be seen to be done by all who come in
contact with the criminal justice system. Of course judicial educa-
tion would be needed-but this is needed in any event, and is part
of an ongoing commitment to achieving justice for all.
Canadian jurisprudence is only now reaching the point where a
legitimate argument can be made for contextualization of the role
of systemic oppression. Judicial inquiry into the factual, social,
and psychological context within which litigation arises is not
unusual.394 Rather, a conscious, contextual inquiry has become an
accepted step towards judicial impartiality.395
The law is not a static entity. It should not be frozen in time
and divorced from the current realities of modern life. Law must
continue to evolve in response to the changing world in which it
functions. As Holmes commented, "[t]he life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience."396 Legal evolution requires the
integration of information coming from other bodies of knowledge,
including the social sciences, about the social realities of all per-
sons who come in contact with the legal system.397 Racial
contextualization may be seen as one such legal evolution.
394. See R. v. S.(R.D.), [19971 3 S.C.R. 484, 506 (Can.).
395. Id.
396. OLIVER WENDELL HOLiES, THE COMIMON LAw 1 (1881).
397. Falk, supra note 163, at 811.
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